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I. INTRODUCTION
The daska Native Claims Settlement Act' ("ANCSA"), historic
legislation intended to settle the aboriginal land claims and titles of
Alaska Natives, 2 was enacted by Congress in 1971 after many years of
debate and discussion on the best method of resolving Native claims. 3
Though filled with detail, the basic theme of ANCSA is straight-
forward. In exchange for the now-extinguished aboriginal claims,
1. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629e (1982 & West Supp. 1988). This statute, as amended
from time to time, is referred to in this article as "ANCSA." ANCSA has been
amended by nearly every Congress since its passage in 1971. Pub. L. No. 93-153, title
IV, § 407, Nov. 16, 1973, 87 Stat. 591; Pub. L. No. 94-204, §§ 3, 4, 6, 7, 9-10, 13, 17,
Jan. 2, 1976, 89 Stat. 1147-50, 1154, 1156; Pub. L. No. 94-273, § 38, Apr. 21, 1976, 90
Stat. 380; Pub. L. No. 94-456, § 1, Oct. 4, 1976, 90 Stat. 1934; Pub. L. No. 95-178,
§§ 2, 4, Nov. 15, 1977, 91 Stat. 1369-70; Pub. L. No. 95-600, title V, § 541, Nov. 6,
1978, 92 Stat. 2887; Pub. L. No. 96-55, § 2, Aug. 14, 1979, 93 Stat. 386; Pub. L. No.
96-311, July 17, 1980, 94 Stat. 947; Pub. L. No. 96-487, title XIV, §§ 904, 908, 1401-
10, Dec. 2, 1980, 94 Stat. 2434, 2447, 2491-96; Pub. L. No. 97-468, title VI, § 606,
Jan. 14, 1983, 96 Stat. 2566; Pub. L. No. 99-96, § 1, Sept. 25, 1985, 99 Stat. 460-62;
Pub. L. No. 99-500, title I, § 101(h), Oct. 18, 1986, 100 Stat. 1783-287; Pub. L. No.
99-591, title I, § 101(h), Oct. 30, 1986, 100 Stat. 3341-287; Pub. L. No. 99-396, § 22,
Aug. 27, 1986, 100 Stat. 846; Pub. L. No. 100-241, §§ 3-5, 7-10, 12, 14-15, Feb. 3,
1988, 101 Stat. 1789-90, 1793, 1795, 1797, 1803, 1805, 1810-12.
2. ANCSA's preamble provides, in part:
Congress finds and declares that -
(a) there is an immediate need for a fair and just settlement of all claims by
Natives and Native groups of Alaska, based on aboriginal land claims;
(b) the settlement should be accomplished rapidly, with certainty, in con-
formity with the real economic and social needs of Natives, without litiga-
tion, with maximum participation by Natives in decisions affecting their
rights and property, without establishing any permanent racially defined in-
stitutions, rights, privileges, or obligations, without creating a reservation
system or lengthy wardship or trusteeship, and without adding to the catego-
ries of property and institutions enjoying special tax privileges or to the legis-
lation establishing special relationships between the United States
Government and the State of Alaska; ....
43 U.S.C. §§ 1601(a), (b) (1982).
3. R. ARNOLD, ALASKA NATIVE LAND CLAIMS 99-144 (1st ed. 1976). Willie
Hensley, a Native leader, described the land claims struggle:
A controversy of immense proportions is rapidly coming to a head in
Alaska. It is a situation which has lain dormant (except for sporadic out-
bursts) since Alaska was purchased from Russia in 1867. This problem has
been skirted by Congress, alternately grappled with by the Department of
the Interior then dropped to allow the furor to settle, kept Alaskan political
leaders frustrated, and the courts have ruled time and again - but never
with finality nor clarity. The problem is simply this: What are the rights of
the Alaskan Natives to the property and resources upon which they have
lived since time immemorial?
Ia at 93 (quoting WILLIAM L. HENSLEY (IGAGRUK), WHAT RIGHTS TO LAND HAVE
THE ALASK.A, NATIVES? (1966)).
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ANCSA directs the transfer of land and cash to Native-owned corpo-
rate entities:4 twelve regional corporations5 and over two hundred vil-
lage corporations.
After nearly two decades of operation, some of the regional and
village corporations have experienced severe financial difficulties, and
a few have sought relief under the United States Bankruptcy Code.6
In the course of these bankruptcy proceedings, conflicts between the
legislative purposes inherent in ANCSA and in the Bankruptcy Code
have come to light. Given these conflicts of purpose, the two statutes
do not mesh well, creating some significant questions as to how some
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code should be implemented in the case
of a Native corporation bankruptcy. This article will examine those
conflicts and questions and explore their implications for Native cor-
porations and their creditors.
Section 7 of ANCSA7 divides the state into twelve regions and
directs that each person defined as an eligible Native be a shareholder
of the regional corporation for the region in which the Native is en-
rolled pursuant to section 5 of ANCSA.8 The majority of Natives are
also shareholders of a village corporation. Sections 11 and 16 of
ANCSA 9 list Native villages potentially eligible for ANCSA's benefits,
and section 810 directs the residents of each village to organize as a
village corporation.11 Those not residents of or enrolled in a village
4. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1605(c), 1613 (1982).
5. ANCSA provided for the possibility of a thirteenth corporation to be formed
for the benefit of Natives not resident in Alaska. Id. § 1606(c). The Thirteenth Re-
gional Corporation was formed. It, also, has sought bankruptcy relief. In re Thir-
teenth Regional Corp., No. 86-06675 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. filed Sept. 17, 1986).
6. In re Tigara Corp., No. 3-86-00707 (Bankr. D. Alaska filed Nov. 12, 1986); In
re Thirteenth Regional Corp., No. 86-06675 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. filed Sept. 17, 1986);
In re Bering Straights Native Corp., No. 2-86-00002 (Bankr. D. Alaska filed Mar. 5,
1986); In re Haida Corp., No. 5X-85-00007 (Bankr. D. Alaska filed May 15, 1985).
7. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(a) (1982).
8. Id. §§ 1604(a), (b).
9. Id. §§ 1610(b), 1615(a).
10. Id. § 1607(a).
11. Under ANCSA, village corporations are, to a degree, dependent upon the
larger and, theoretically, more sophisticated and prosperous regional corporations;
however, the village corporations are not subsidiaries of the regionals. Section 5 of
ANCSA directs the Secretary of the Interior to enroll Natives in one of the twelve
regions of the state, and section 7(g) requires each regional corporation to issue 100
shares of common stock to each Native enrolled in the region. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1604,
1606(g) (1982). Section 8 of ANCSA directs the Natives of each village to organize as
a village corporation and incorporates by reference the stock transfer restrictions ap-
plicable to regional corporations. Id. § 1607. Certain provisions of ANCSA section 7
contemplate payments by regional corporations to village corporations in the region
and to regional corporation shareholders who are not residents of those villages. Id.
§ 1606(j), (m). Thus, regional and village corporations have common shareholders
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are referred to as "at-large" shareholders of their regional
corporation.12
Both regional and village corporations are organized under
Alaska law. Village corporations may be either profit or nonprofit, 13
but all have elected to be organized for profit; 14 regional corporations
are to be profit-making. 15 To conform to standard Alaska practice,
regional and village corporations are referred to generically in this ar-
ticle as "Native corporations."
Both regional and village corporations are entitled to cash and
land selections under ANCSA. Section 6 of ANCSA 16 establishes the
Alaska Native Fund, aggregating $962.5 million for distribution to
Native corporations and their shareholders. Pursuant to sections 11
and 16 of the Act,17 federal land was withdrawn for selection by vil-
lage and regional corporations under sections 12 and 16.18 Following
review of the selections, the lands are conveyed to the corporations. 19
The total land entitlement under the Act is some 44 million acres.20
because each village corporation shareholder is also a shareholder of the regional cor-
poration in which the village is located. However, because they are separate corpora-
tions, each regional and village corporation has separate directors and officers. In
fact, a village corporation may operate at odds with "its" regional corporation. The
205 potential village corporations listed in ANCSA and the additional eligible villages,
id. § 1610(b), have now been reduced, through mergers, consolidations, and other-
wise, to approximately 175.
12. Approximately one-third of enrolled Natives are "at-large" shareholders.
About two-thirds are shareholders of village corporations as well as regional corpora-
tions. R. ARNOLD, supra note 3, at 219.
13. 43 U.S.C. § 1607(a) (1982).
14. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, ANCSA 1985 STUDY, 111-2 (Draft June 29,
1984) (prepared in response to requirements of section 23 of ANCSA). See also Price,
A Moment in History: The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 8 UCLA-ALASKA L.
REv. 89, 95 (1979). It should be noted that Alaska law does not permit nonprofit
corporations to issue stock. ALASKA STAT. § 10.20.136 (1988). This by itself may
have resulted in all of the villages organizing as for-profit companies.
15. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(d) (1982).
16. Id. § 1605.
17. Id. §§ 1610, 1615.
18. Id. §§ 1611, 1615.
19. Id. §§ 1613(a), (b).
20. ANCSA authorizes the conveyance of 40 million acres of federal lands to
Native corporations, subject to certain third-party claims. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1611(a), (b),
(c), 1613(h) (1982). Section 19(b) of ANCSA authorizes the conveyance of former
reserve lands lo Native corporations. Id. § 1618(b). About 4 million acres of lands
are affected by section 19(b). Interview with Robert Arndorfer, Deputy State Direc-
tor, Cadastral Survey, Bureau of Land Management, Dep't of the Interior (Feb. 25,
1989).
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These transfers of cash and land are the consideration given by Con-
gress in exchange for the extinguishment of the aboriginal land claims
of Alaska Natives. 21
The decision to transfer land and cash directly to corporations of
which Natives would be shareholders, 22 rather than to more tradi-
tional entities, such as tribal or reservation units, was an experiment.
The legislation hoped to foster independence and avoid the govern-
ment-as-trustee approach characterizing previous settlements with In-
dians of the "lower 48."23 Drafters and sponsors of the legislation, as
well as Native and state leaders who participated in the drafting and
lobbying effort that preceded the enactment of ANCSA, were aware of
the imperfections of federal Indian policy and the inconsistent results
which had been achieved. 24 Proponents of the legislation wished to
21. 43 U.S.C. § 1603 (1982). See also United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435
F. Supp. 1009, 1021 (D. Alaska 1977), aff'd, 612 F.2d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980).
22. See Alaska Native Claims: Hearings on S. 2906, et aL Before the Comm. on
Interior and Insular Affairs, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 2, 580 (1968) (statement of
Senator Jackson).
Despite the fact that the use of corporations to receive and administer the land
and cash constitutes a radical departure from previous federal settlements with Native
Americans, the legislative history of ANCSA does not contain significant discussions
of the policy choice. Following the 1968 Federal Field Commission Report, which
recommended the use of corporations, all subsequent proposals for legislation incor-
porated the concept of the corporation as the vehicle for administration of the settle-
ment. K. Bass, III, The ANCSA Structure Beyond 1991 - Patching Up or Total
Revision, in ALASKA FEDERATION OF NATIVES, INC., 1991: A LEGAL ANALYSIS
(Oct. 1984). See also Note, Legislation: The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act:
Legislation Appropriate to the Past and the Future, 9 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 135 (1981)
(author concludes that the Natives suggested the corporate form of administration in
order to increase economic development and avoid dependency upon reservation
status).
23. The desire not to follow previous methods of settling Indian claims is appar-
ent from the disavowal in section 2 of ANCSA of "permanent racially defined institu-
tions," "lengthy wardship," or "reservation system." AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY
REVIEW COMM'N, 94TH CONG., 2D. SESs., SPECIAL JOINT TASK FORCE REPORT ON
ALASKA NATIVE ISSUES 18 (1976).
24. Id. The report includes the following testimony from the Tlingit-Haida Cen-
tral Council regarding the Native sentiment in southeast Alaska preceding passage of
the Act: "Alaskan Natives rejected the idea of reservation trust land, and [Bureau of
Indian Affairs] interference because they saw the gross mismanagement of the canner-
ies in [southeastern Alaska] by the [Bureau of Indian Affairs]. They felt they wanted
to make their own mistakes." Id. at 48. The Commission reported: "The natives
wanted to be free of Federal incompetency at any cost - even at the cost of eventually
losing their money and land." Id. at 39.
See generally 1 ALASKA NATIVE REVIEW COMM'N, TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEED-
INGS, OVERVIEW ROUNDTAB3LE DISCUSSIONS (Feb. 27, 1984) [hereinafter ROUND-
TABLE DISCUSSIONS]. These Roundtable Discussions, led by Judge Thomas Berger,
attempted to identify the aspirations and expectations of Alaska Natives when
ANCSA was formulated, whether they had been fulfilled or met, and how they had
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adopt a new, more capitalist-style model, utilizing the form of the cor-
poration to manage the benefits of ANCSA and to attempt to obtain
ever-elusive prosperity for Alaska's Native people.2 5
changed; they also examined the effects of using the corporate model as the settlement
vehicle. John Borbridge, a participant in the Roundtable Discussions, president of
Tlingit-Haida Central Council during passage of ANCSA, and an early president of
Sealaska Corporation, described a goal of ANCSA's proponents as "freedom from
interference by the Department of Interior and the [Bureau of Indian Affairs], who,
much of the Native leadership felt, had not been too successful in addressing, over
many, many years, the concerns that have been repeatedly expressed by the Native
people." Id. at 42.
Emil Notti, one of the first presidents of the Alaska Federation of Natives, testi-
fied in field hearings before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs:
[T]here is a strong feeling among the native people in Alaska, that they want
to have control of their own destiny. And if there are going to be mistakes
made, we want to make them, not let the bad decisions be made in Juneau,
or even farther away in Washington, D.C. I stand here before you to state in
the strongest terms possible that the representatives here today, of 50,000
native people in Alaska do not want paternal guidance from Washington,
D.C. We feel we have the ability to make our own way and once we get a
fair settlement of our lands, it will enable us to operate our businesses. At
first, no doubt, with the aid of competent advice, until our own men learn
business management.
Alaska Native Land Claims: Hearing on S.2906 et al. Before the Comm. on Interior
and Insular Affairs, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1968) (statement of Notti).
25. Fred Paul, a Native attorney who worked as a representative of the Arctic
Slope Native Association during passage of ANCSA, stated at the Roundtable Discus-
sions: "Western society was moving in and it was necessary that the settlement pro-
vide enough white man's tools to compete in a white man's world, and so that's in
part, the acceptance by the Native leadership of the corporate concept." 1 ROUND-
TABLE DIscussIoNs, supra note 24, at 61.
ANCSA's drafters stated: "The corporation will very rapidly become an impor-
tant element in the economic development of the natives in Alaska. The permanency
of the corporate form as well as the protection against personal liabilities of its officers
and directors is quite important given the nature of this undertaking." H.R. REP. No.
523, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 2192, 2209.
Much as Indian allotments (which are similar to homesteads) were seen as a way
of "mainstreaming" Native Americans in the late nineteenth century at a time when
the fainily farm represented the American way of life, corporations were seen as a way
of "mainstreaming" Native Alaskans in the late twentieth century. An article in For-
tune characterized ANCSA as follows: "Rather than set up more Indian reservations,
Congress turned to modern society's most sophisticated and efficient institution, the
corporation, to receive and administer the land and cash." Schuyten, A Novel Corpo-
ration Takes Charge in Alaska's Wilderness, FORTUNE, Oct. 1975, at 158.
However, according to Ann Fineup-Riordan, an anthropologist whose paper,
"The Spirit of ANCSA: Native Aspirations and the Alaska Native Claims Settlement
Act," served as the starting point of the Alaska Native Review Commission's Round-
table Discussions:
The idea, as expressed in the testimony [of Alaska Natives in 1968 concern-
ing the proposed legislation], was that Western material advantages would
be used to support rather than to supplant the maintenance of traditional
[V/ol. 6:73
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Congress selected the corporation as the primary vehicle for com-
pensating Alaska Natives, but Congress did not identify any particular
mission for Native corporations to fulfill once they had received their
land and their cash.26 The selection of the corporate model and the
Native values. The maintenance of cultural integrity was a conscious goal in
the [1968] testimony but it had relatively low profile. It didn't get talked
about explicitly a lot. However, it was clearly underlying the discussions of
the inherent value of the land and the way of life that living off the land
made possible. Thus, it was an implicit goal while the testimony was domi-
nated by the mechanics of the settlement ....
Again, the Natives, in the [1968] testimony, expressed a desire to escape
their immediate past of powerlessness and poverty but not their past values.
They wanted ... were willing to conform to Western standards but they did
not want total integration.
I ROUNDTABLE DIscussIoNs, supra note 24, at 32.
26. This is particularly true for regional corporations. The term "Regional Cor-
poration" is defined in subsection 3(g) of ANCSA simply as: "an Alaska Native Re-
gional Corporation established under the laws of the State of Alaska in accordance
with the provisions of this [Act]; ..... " 43 U.S.C. § 1602(g) (1982). See also Note,
Settling the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 38 STANFORD L. REv. 227 (1985).
The definition of "Village Corporation" more amply describes the role village
corporations are to fulfill. Subsection 3G) of ANCSA states:
"Village Corporation" means an Alaska Native Village Corporation organ-
ized under the laws of the State of Alaska as a business for profit or nonprofit
corporation to hold, invest, manage and/or distribute lands, property, funds,
and other rights and assets for and on behalf of a Native village in accord-
ance with the terms of this [Act]; ....
Id. § 1602(g).
In other legislation, Congress has recognized the "Native" character of the Na-
tive corporations and given them special treatment accordingly, equating them with
traditional Indian tribes for certain federal benefit purposes. See e.g., 25 U.S.C.
§ 450b(b) (1982) (Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act); id.
§§ 1903(3), 1903(8) (Indian Child Welfare Act). However, these acts provide Native
corporations with opportunities, not mandates.
Within the framework of the corporate form, Congress has left the specific goals
and purposes of the corporations up to the individual corporations and their share-
holders. The recent amendments to ANCSA reflect this orientation.
Section 2. The Congress finds and declares that -
(5) to ensure the continued success of the settlement and to guarantee
Natives continued participation in decisions affecting their rights and
property, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act must be amended to
enable the shareholders of each Native Corporation to structure the fur-
ther implementation of the settlement in light of their particular cir-
cumstances and needs;
(6) among other things, the shareholders or each Native Corporation
must be permitted to decide -
(A) when restriction on alienation of stock issued as part of the
settlement should be terminated, and
(B) whether Natives born after December 18, 1971, should partici-
pate in the settlement;
(7) by granting the shareholders of each Native Corporation options to
structure the further implementation of the settlement, Congress is not
1989]
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injection of a billion dollars implied that the Native corporations
should develop and operate as businesses which make a profit.27 Yet
most corporations appear to devote at least some resources to improv-
ing the social and economic welfare of their shareholders.28 Many Na-
tive corporations have acted as employers of last resort; and they
operate unprofitable or marginally profitable businesses needed by
their communities. Native corporations also sponsor cultural pro-
grams and subsidize educational opportunities of their shareholders.
In addition, costs of land management, which may include manage-
ment for subsistence, may be substantial. 29
In the fifteen years since ANCSA corporations were organized,
some have fared very well in the commercial world but many have
not. Some of the regional corporations now operate diverse enter-
prises at a profit and play a major role in Alaska's economy. 30 Others
expressing an opinion on the manner in which such shareholders choose
to balance individual rights and cummunal rights; ...
Pub. L. No. 100-241, § 2, Feb. 3, 1988, 101 Stat. 1788. See also Note, supra, at 248
(ANCSA does not explain relationship between Native corporations and government,
nor position of corporations within body of Indian law).
27. In describing the early testimony by Natives on the land claims legislation,
which for the most part concerned the settlement as a whole as opposed to the
mechanics of a particular bill, Fineup-Riordan states: "[T]he emphasis was on eco-
nomic self-sufficiency and development. This emphasis was both pronounced and ex-
plicit and it ... [sic] of what was asked of ANCSA. If the native community has
reservations about the issue of the corporate vehicle, for instance, these reservations
were not in the testimony." 1 ROUNDTABLE DIsCUSSIONS, supra note 24, at 34.
This pro-economic development, capitalist-oriented mission is implicit in the re-
quirement that the regional corporations be "for profit" business corporations. 43
U.S.C. § 1606(d) (1982). See also S. REP. No. 405, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 105 (1971).
28. Worl, Larry Merculieff. A Corporate Leader with Traditional Values, ALASKA
NATIVE NEWS, Apr. 1983, at 28 ("[T]he village corporation is much more than a
profit-making organization" and provides "the means through its profits to work for
the cultural as well as economic survival of the people."); Willie Hensley: Native Cor-
porations Aim to Produce More than Profits, 14 ALASKA BUS. AND INDUSTRY, Sept.
1982, at 21 (president of NANA Regional Corporation states objectives not limited to
profits); Social Impact Seminar Held, ALASKA NATIVE MGMT. REP., Nov. 15, 1976,
at 7 (quoting Jack Wick, President of Koniag: "The responsibility of (Alaska Native)
Corporations to shareholders is much more than the rate of return on investments.");
Sackett, Viewpoint: Doyon President Tells Regional Firm's Plans for Future, 6
ALASKA INDUSTRY, June 1974, at 46, 82 (president discusses Doyon, Ltd.'s dual pur-
pose of profit and employment).
29. Roy Huhndorf, President of Cook Inlet Region, Inc., stated: "Progress in
Native communities depends to a great deal on self-esteem. Human development en-
tails a much broader focus than required of conventional corporations. It's an all-
encompassing job, much larger than that facing the average corporation." Fuerst,
Trailblazers, ALASKA Bus. MONTHLY, Dec. 1988, at 26.
30. One profitable regional corporation is Cook Inlet Region, Inc. ("CIRI"). Ac-
cording to the CIRI's 1987 Annual Report, CIRI had retained earnings of
$120,300,017 as of December 31, 1987.
[Vol. 6:73
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are struggling,31 and two, Bering Straits Native Corporation and the
Thirteenth Regional Corporation, filed petitions under chapter 11 of
the United States Bankruptcy Code in 1986.32
The record of the village corporations has also been mixed. It is
not surprising that many of the village corporations, which are smaller
and less well capitalized than the regional corporations and which
generally operate outside the state's major economic centers, have
achieved little economically. 33 Two village corporations, Haida
31. Koniag, Inc., reported an accumulated deficit of $19,457,394 as of March 31,
1987, as compared to a deficit of $20,813,620 a year earlier. Koniag, Inc., and Subsid-
iaries, Consolidated Financial Statements, May 29, 1987. In 1983, Koniag announced
it might be forced to seek bankruptcy protection. A Year of Change for Alaska's Re-
gional Native Companies, ALASKA Bus. AND INDUSTRY, Sept. 1983, at 26.
32. See In re Bering Straits Native Corp., No. 2-86-00002 (Bankr. D. Alaska filed
Mar. 5, 1986); In re Thirteenth Regional Corp., No. 86-06675 (Bankr. W.D. Wash.
filed Sept. 17, 1986). Bering Straits' series of poor investments shortly after incorpora-
tion brought about an involuntary bankruptcy petition against it in 1977. ALASKA
INDUSTRY, Jan. 1978, at 26. Bering Straits' case was resolved by confirmation of a
plan of reorganization on May 3, 1988, modified January 4, 1989.
33. A General Accounting Office study reported a December 1982/January 1983
survey of all regional and village corporations regarding their financial condition and
prospects. One hundred percent of the regional corporations and 74% of the village
corporations responded. Forty-four of 107 respondents reported a loss in 1982, and
35 of the 107 reported a loss in each of the previous three years. GENERAL AC-
COUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE HONORABLE TED STEVENS, UNITED STATES
SENATE - INFORMATION ON ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS (Aug. 16, 1983).
In March 1983, Tanana Chiefs Conference, Inc., published a study consisting of a
series of papers on the perceived inadequacies of the ANCSA solution to Native
claims settlement. TANANA CHIEFS CONFERENCE, INC., INTERIOR REGION POST-
ANCSA IMPACT ANALYSIS (Mar. 1983) [hereinafter PoST-ANCSA IMPACT STUDY].
A paper by K. Grabinska in the Post-ANCSA Impact Study notes that village
corporations typically suffer from remote locations and limited personnel with busi-
ness experience. POST-ANCSA IMPACT STUDY, supra, at 9.
According to an Alaska Native Management Report dated September 1, 1976,
two village corporations had enrollments over 2,000; two had between 1,000 and
2,000; five others had over 600 shareholders; and 37 had between 300 and 600 share-
holders. This left approximately 150 with smaller populations. While the number of
village corporations has subsequently been reduced through merger to about 172,
nearly all are still in the under-300 group.
All Native corporations under ANCSA were set up in a vacuum, without first
developing entrepreneurial skills or capital wealth in the area served by the corpora-
tions. POsT-ANCSA IMPACT STUDY, supra, at 18. The difficulties of operating a
small village corporation according to standard business principles are illustrated in
an article published in Alaska Industry Magazine The article points out that, in April
1978, over 70% of the village corporations were delinquent in their required filings
with the State Division of Banking, Securities, and Corporations. Sanak Native Cor-
poration, located on the Aleutian Chain, with 26 shareholders, spent twice its annual
income on its required annual corporate audit. A Helping Hand for the Native Village
Firms, ALASKA INDUSTRY MAG., July 1987.
Some of the village corporations, particularly those with larger enrollments, have
been successful. Sitnasuak Native Corporation, the village corporation for Nome, had
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Corporation and Tigara Corporation, have also filed chapter 11 peti-
tions.34 Others, in contrast, have achieved substantial profits and
probably will continue to prosper.35
a January 1, 1987, enrollment of 2,147, larger than the enrollment of Ahtna, Inc., or
Chugach Natives, Inc., two of the 13 regional corporations. Sitnasuak reported earn-
ings of $396,771 for 1987, with retained earnings at the end of the year of $1,994,073.
Sitnasuak Native Corp. and Subsidiaries, Consolidated Statement of Earnings (Loss),
Feb. 19, 1988, at 9. According to an article in Alaska Native News, March 1983,
Sitnasuak's success is attributed to a conservative investment policy and concentration
in local business ventures with which the shareholders and management are familiar.
Bloom, Nome Native Corporation Has Bright Future, ALASKA NATIVE NEWS, Mar.
1983, at 27.
However, not all of the larger village corporations have been successful.
Goldbelt, Inc., the village corporation for Juneau, had an accumulated earnings deficit
of $166,511,200 as of December 31, 1986. A 1987 sale of net operating losses reduced
the deficit to $121,432,900 by December 31, 1987. Goldbelt, Inc., and Subsidiaries,
Consolidated *Balance Sheets as of December 31, 1987 and 1986, Jan. 21, 1988. Ac-
cording to an article in Alaska Native Magazine, Dec. 1987, Goldbelt was near bank-
ruptcy until rescued by this loss sale. Hoffman, A Review of Southeast Village and
Urban Corporations, ALASKA NATIVE MAG., Dec. 1987, at 40.
Village Journey, the Report of the Alaska Native Review Commission by the
Honorable Thomas R. Berger, contains an eloquent summary of the problems faced
by village corporations:
A village corporation with one hundred shareholders received about $80,000
from the initial distribution of funds in December 1973. The Alaska Native
Foundation has calculated that the minimum cost to a village of carrying out
the corporate duties that ANCSA has imposed on it is about $70,000 annu-
ally. Over ten years, most villages received less than $200,000 in total from
the Native Fund, and that amount could not long support operating budgets,
let alone pay dividends. As early as 1974, a study carried out by the Depart-
ment of the Interior estimated that any village with fewer than six hundred
shareholders had little chance of success. Only eight villages out of the more
than two hundred village corporations exceeded six hundred shareholders;
another five had five hundred or more shareholders. From the beginning,
the great majority of village corporations were seriously undercapitalized.
... In most villages, no commercial business could have succeeded, and
the bankruptcy of many village corporations seems to be inevitable.
T. BERGER, VILLAGE JOURNEY: THE REPORT OF THE ALASKA NATIVE REVIEW
COMMISSION 33, 36 (1985).
34. In re Haida Corp., No. 5X-85-00007 (Bankr. D. Alaska filed May 15, 1985),
In re Tigara Corp., No. 3-86-00707 (Bankr. D. Alaska filed Nov. 12, 1986). A plan of
reorganization for Haida Corporation was confirmed July 19, 1988, pursuant to which
Haida Corporation's creditors are paid in full. Haida Corporation succeeded in ob-
taining federal legislation in 1986 and 1987 authorizing the sale of some of its land to
the United States for cash. Pub. L. No. 99-664 (Nov. 17, 1986).
35. Klukwan, Inc. was ranked by the Alaska Business Monthly magazine as
the tenth largest company in Alaska for 1986 and it is expected to climb
even higher in 1987. It is the only village corporation to rank among the top
50 corporations in the state. In 1986, its sales reached an all time record of
$47 million, up from the previous year's sales of $28.3 million.
The company's major investments include subsidiaries in timber devel-
opment, stevedoring, expediting and an investment company. The company
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In the two village corporation bankruptcies, the regional corpora-
tion for each village was a major unsecured creditor. In one of the two
regional corporation bankruptcies, the villages collectively held most
of the debt. The other regional corporation that filed, the Thirteenth
Regional Corporation, does not have villages. The fact that Native
corporations, themselves, may be major creditors in Native corpora-
tion bankruptcies adds yet another layer of complexity to the issues
addressed in this article.
Alaska's Native culture did not have a long entrepreneurial tradi-
tion, and there were few Alaska Natives with substantial business ex-
perience to sit on the boards of directors, or serve as executives, of the
new corporations. 36 From the perspective of hindsight, it may have
been a mistake to assume that these fledgling businesses would thrive.
In fact, many have not. The newly acquired capital was invested, or
even squandered, by some of the regional corporations in acquiring
existing businesses, some at inflated prices, which the corporations
were unable to manage efficiently. 37 Some of the regional and village
corporations commenced doing business in traditionally risky fields
(for example, construction) in the hope of providing employment for
also has a real estate joint-venture in Phoenix, Arizona, with an outside com-
pany.
Klukwan has been the lead in providing shareholder benefits and serv-
ices. The corporation provides its shareholders with scholarships, job train-
ing, services for the elders, a monthly corporate newsletter, opportunities for
employment and substantial monthly dividends ....
Hoffman, supra note 33.
36. Lillie McGarvey, an Aleut long active in Native affairs, remarked at the
Alaska Native Review Commission's Roundtable Discussions:
Congress said we must be corporations, both regional and village. So all of a
sudden, people ... some of us could hardly spell corporation.., were all of
a sudden managing corporations. We became boards of directors, we be-
came presidents, secretaries, vice presidents, treasurers of million dollar cor-
porations. It's just as if somebody went down on the streets of Anchorage,
picked up anybody coming up the street and said, "Hey, you're a corpora-
tion president " or "You're a corporation secretary." There was no provi-
sion for any type of training to really show us what a corporation was, how it
should be run. So we have struggled.
2 ROUNDTABLE DIscussIoNs, supra note 24, at 105.
37. These unfortunate developments were predicted by at least one commentator:
The final feature of the Regional Corporations distinguishing them from
other Alaska business corporations will be their lack of business background
or purpose. Most corporations are formed either after the business is a going
concern or when there is at least a contemplation of particular business ven-
tures. The Regional Corporations, by contrast, will have to develop their
business orientation after the fact. A possible effect of this is that a great
deal of money may be wasted in the early life of the Regional Corporations
through poor management and hastily conceived endeavors."
Note, Charitable Donations Under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 3 UCLA-
ALASKA L. REv. 148, 154 (1973).
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their shareholders and, consequently, suffered severe losses which have
crippled their ability to become the economic forces their founders
intended.
The risk of financial loss, or even collapse and bankruptcy, is in-
herent in the capitalist economic system in which the Native corpora-
tions were intended to operate. Business failure, whether or not
formally recognized by bankruptcy proceedings, is a common event in
the United States.38 However painful for those directly affected, it is
not generally thought to have profound social or economic policy im-
plications, except in the rare case of very large corporations whose
collapse would substantially disrupt the economy or in the case of
businesses which provide goods or services thought vital to national
security. Indeed, laissez-faire economic theory teaches that a certain
degree of failure must be accepted as the price of progress. More effi-
cient and productive enterprises should prosper and grow as those less
successful lag behind in competition. Businesses which cannot profita-
bly produce goods or services at a competitive price should be allowed,
if not encouraged, to fail and make room for those more capable of
satisfying the community's needs. Subsidizing or protecting unpro-
ductive or inefficient enterprises can be done only at the cost of higher
consumer prices and the diversion of investment capital from more
profitable uses.
This, however, is a difficult and perhaps callous doctrine to apply
to the Native corporations. The corporations were created as the vehi-
cle for satisfying the historic claims of Alaska Natives to Alaska's
lands and mineral wealth, and they were intended to provide for the
social and economic progress of their shareholders. The proponents
and drafters of ANCSA regarded the corporate concept as a means of
bringing economic gain and progress to Alaska Natives. However,
they also intended the regional and village corporations to serve pur-
poses more complex than pure profit.39 Therefore, it is difficult to con-
clude that Native Corporations, as opposed to ordinary business
38. "A capitalist without the threat of bankruptcy is like a Christian without the
threat of Hell." Robert Gray, President of National Bank of Alaska, Anchorage Daily
News, Feb. 26, 1989, at B-1.
39. ANCSA's legislative history indicates that Native corporations were to per-
form broader functions than just those of business and profit-making. Although ear-
lier versions of ANCSA separated the investment and social welfare functions of
ANCSA corporations into different entities, they were combined in the final version.
See C. Goldmark, J. Wickwire & J. Hanley, The 1991 Takeover Problem: A Report to
the Alaska Federation of Natives, in ALASKA FEDERATION OF NATIvES, INC., 1991:
A LEGAL ANALYSIS 1-6, 16-20 (1984).
Fineup-Riordan summarized the early testimony of the Alaska Native commu-
nity on the claims legislation as emphasizing five major concerns: (1) continuity of use
and occupancy of the land; (2) the importance of cash compensation for economic
development; (3) the resolution of past social ills and full participation in the future;
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ventures, should be allowed to fail as the marketplace dictates.4° The
failure and disappearance of a regional or village corporation would
risk the loss of the compensation granted the Native shareholders as
settlement of their aboriginal claims. Failure of the corporation also
would deprive the Native shareholders of the social and cultural sup-
port that many of the corporations have come to provide in response
to perceived community needs.4 1
(4) the achievement of self-sufficiency and self-determination; and (5) continuity as
cultural integrity. 1 ROUNDTABLE DiscussIoNs, supra note 24, at 23-35.
The difficulties of achieving these complex purposes were aptly described by By-
ron Mallott, President of Sealaska Corporation, in the Alaska Native Review Com-
mission's Roundtable Discussions. Mr. Mallott discussed the view that ANCSA was
characterized as a major social and economic experiment, unique in the an-
nals of U.S. history. I bought that concept and I thought that the corporate
vehicle, the legal corporate structure, could be used to do more than tradi-
tionally it had done, that it could be more than just an economic institution,
that it could influence by our having control of the institution, political and
social and other issues beyond just the economic. And, at least my experi-
ence subsequently has been, that is very difficult to do. Corporations de-
mand an incredible sense of discipline and economic focus in order to be
competitive on the business side. And the utilization of corporate assets re-
quires that almost all of those assets be employed in some sort of economic
kind of activity, and the demands upon the management and the policy-
makers of those institutions are so much demanding of continuing in almost
pure focus on economic and business kinds of activities, that, over time,
other priorities and other obligations, if you're not careful, begin to fade.
And, in my judgment also, that is a difficulty that we face as a people.
... But so long as the land... which most Native people at the time felt
was given to the corporations as stewards for some long-term, Native-ori-
ented, subsistence-oriented, tribal-oriented, culturally [sic] oriented purpose,
is retained in ownership of the corporations, I think we have a major diffi-
culty because at 1991 ... if you sell your stock, you sell your land....
... [T]he corporations, for all the pressures upon them, for economic
success, have retained ownership of the land, and they've done it because of
the strong sense that they are stewards. But the question becomes, how long
can that be maintained with the business and legal imperatives and obliga-
tions that corporations, as institutions, have upon them?
4 ROUNDTABLE DIscussIoNs, supra note 24, at 311-312.
40. The Institute of Social and Economic Research summarizes a number of pro-
posed changes to ANCSA which were discussed in the mid-1980s.
These and other changes that Native groups want are major, and they would
alter a basic premise of the 1971 settlement act - which was that corpora-
tions established under the act would, after a certain period, be much like
any other American corporation, subject to the same risks and opportunities.
Many Native leaders today say that lands awarded Alaska Natives in settle-
ment of their aboriginal land claims should not be at such risk of loss - that
their ownership should be protected for future generations.
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH, UNIV. OF ALASKA (Oct. 1985), at
26.
41. See, e.g., Take Our Land, Take Our Stock, Take Our Life, ALASKA NATIVE
NEws, Sept. 1984, at 7 (Sealaska Corporation must "respond to social and cultural
demands of its constituency," as well as make profit).
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Business corporations were originally conceived as vehicles for
voluntary investment of risk capital. Failure of the venture was a fore-
seeable possibility from the outset and a risk assumed by the voluntary
investor. Native corporations, on the other hand, were created by a
political process. Though the Alaska Native leadership testified at
congressional hearings, participated in the drafting of many of
ANCSA's provisions, and approved the bill prior to its signing, the
individual Alaska Native did not make an informed and voluntary
choice to subject his or her ancestral land claims to the risks of a lais-
sez-faire economic system. The original ANCSA may have left ambi-
guities about the role the corporations 42 were to play and the degree to
which the corporations were charged with protecting the traditional
way of life while creating a new one, but the Act clearly jeopardized
the assets necessary for maintenance of the traditional lifestyle (that is,
the land) in the course of making it available for use as capital in the
cash economy. With the exception of a twenty-year exemption from
real property taxation, ANCSA, as originally enacted, 43 contained
nothing to stem the loss of Native corporation lands to creditors, even
though scores of Native Americans had lost their land that way for
generations.
As the year 1991, the twentieth anniversary of ANCSA, has ap-
proached, the question of whether it is appropriate to conclude that
the business failure of a Native corporation should cause the loss of all
its lands and income rights and, therefore, cause its shareholders to
lose their entire investment, representing the lands and revenues to
which they claimed aboriginal title, has been increasingly voiced.44
According to the original ANCSA provisions, restrictions on share
transfer and limitation on taxes of ANCSA corporations' lands were
to end in 1991, 45 and the corporations and their shareholders would, it
42. Senator Henry Jackson, Chairman of the Senate Interior and Insular Affairs
Committee during consideration and passage of ANCSA and a sponsor of the legisla-
tion, reportedly stated that the wording of the Act was deliberately left vague in order
to allow room for flexibility. Schuyten, supra note 25, at 168.
43. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(h)(1) (1982) (originally enacted as Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688, 781 (1971)).
44. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 201, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 2021 (1987) (threat of invol-
untary loss of Native land by failing Native corporations on e of significant problems
in implementation of ANCSA settlement); T. BERGER, VILLAGE JOURNEY: THE RE-
PORT OF THE ALASKA NATIVE REvIEw COMMISSSION 167-68 (1985) (recommends
lands be transferred out of corporate control to keep them in Native hands); Oversight
Hearings on the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act Before the Comm. on Interior
and Insular Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 20, 24 (1985); 1991 Issues and AFN Work
Plan, ALASKA NATIVE NEWS, May/June 1984, at 14; Alaska Federation of Natives
Draft 1991 Resolutions, ALASKA NATIVE NEWS, June 1985, at 28; Worl, The Quest
for Tribal Survival, ALASKA NATIVE MAG., Oct. 1985, at 8.
45. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(h)(3) (1982).
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was hoped, be ready to compete on an equal footing with all other
business ventures. However, doubt over the viability of many Native
corporations, concern that they should not be forced to compete in the
free marketplace for investors' funds, and a strong desire to retain the
corporations and their land assets in Native hands, led to the passage
of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act Amendments of 1987.46
These amendments were the result of extraordinary efforts on the part
of the Alaska Native community to overhaul and revise ANCSA to
make it more responsive to their needs. This legislation, often referred
to as the "1991 Amendments" because of its impact on provisions in-
tended to be operative in 1991, continues share transfer restrictions
and makes other changes intended to enhance Native control of
ANCSA corporate stock and property.47 While allaying some of the
concerns of loss due to business failure or takeover, the 1991 Amend-
ments by no means protect the Native corporations from all risks in-
herent in business operations.
At a time of increasing concern over the future of Native corpora-
tions and their assets, the question of the degree to which they were
intended to, or should now, be subject to the risks of the marketplace
46. Pub. L. No. 100-241, 101 Stat. 1788 (1988). The congressional findings and
statement of policy enacted as part of the ANCSA Amendments of 1987 contain the
following statement:
The Congress finds and declares that -
i5)" to ensure the continued success of the settlement and to guarantee Na-
tives continued participation in decisions affecting their rights and property,
[ANCSA] must be amended to enable the shareholders of each Native Cor-
poration to structure the further implementation of the settlement in the
light of their particular circumstances and needs; ....
Id.
47. Among these changes is a provision that alienability restrictions on stock is-
sued to Native corporation shareholders ("Settlement Common Stock") shall continue
until terminated by shareholder vote in accordance with 43 U.S.C.A. § 1629b(c) and
(d) (West Supp. 1988), and a provision that undeveloped land conveyed to Native
corporations by the federal government shall be exempt from execution and real prop-
erty taxation, 43 U.S.C.A. § 1636(d) (West Supp. 1988).
Recent amendments to ANCSA provide a mechanism by which Native corpora-
tions can spin assets off to a separate entity, called a "settlement trust," specifically
charged with the promotion of the health, education, and welfare of the corporation's
Native shareholders and the preservation of Native heritage and culture. 43 U.S.C.A.
§ 1629e(b) (West Supp. 1988). Settlement trusts permanently insulate those assets
from the business risks of the corporation because their assets are protected from the
claims of the grantor corporation's creditors. Settlement trusts may not operate as a
business. Congress established this new form of ownership for the proceeds of the
ANCSA settlement in recognition of the fact that "the purposes of the Act may be
carried out better by allowing Alaska Natives to alter their form of ownership." 133
CONG. REc. Hi1,936 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1987) (joint analysis submitted by Congress-
men Udall and Young); 133 CONG. REc. S18,702 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1987) (joint
analysis submitted by Senators Murkowski and Stevens).
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is presented in the context of the pending bankruptcy cases and will
arise again if other Native corporations choose to seek bankruptcy
protection. This question may also surface if creditors commence in-
voluntary proceedings against a Native corporation under section 303
of the United States Bankruptcy Code.
The United States Bankruptcy Code ("the Code"), codified at ti-
tle 11 of the United States Code,48 is designed to provide an orderly
and rational means for the liquidation or financial reorganization (if
possible) of the property of individuals and businesses which have
sought bankruptcy relief (referred to in the Code, and here, as "debt-
ors").49 While insolvency is not a requirement for the filing of a vol-
untary bankruptcy petition,50 most individuals and businesses seeking
bankruptcy relief are insolvent under either a "balance sheet test" (in-
sufficient assets to meet liabilities) or an "equity test" (inability to meet
debts as they mature, usually due to a lack of financial liquidity).
A comprehensive discussion of the pertinent Bankruptcy Code
provisions is beyond the scope of this article. However, a brief sum-
mary of the provisions will be attempted. In general, the Code fulfills
several purposes. It provides a period of relief from creditor pressure
during which the assets and liabilities of the debtor, and the prospects
for continuation of the business conducted by the debtor, can be ana-
lyzed.51 It furnishes a means for identifying the property to be used
for paying creditors' claims or reorganizing the business to generate
the income for claim payment.5 2 It dictates how the assets of the
debtor are to be managed during the liquidation or reorganization pro-
cess, which may continue for months or years.5 3 It sets forth the pri-
ority in which creditors' claims are to be paid.5 4 It also dictates the
degree to and manner in which the claims of creditors are to be satis-
fied if the business is to be successfully reorganized and avoid
liquidation.55
The Code implicitly assumes that artificial entities, such as corpo-
rations and partnerships, which are presumed to have been voluntarily
created (usually for profit), have no valid reason to continue in exist-
ence once they are unprofitable and are judicially determined to be
incapable of financial resurrection. In comparison, natural persons
48. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
49. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (1982). Though the Bankruptcy Code deals with both
"consumer" and "business" bankruptcies, this article will concentrate on provisions
pertaining to the reorganization or liquidation of insolvent businesses.
50. 11 U.S.C. §§ 109, 301 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
51. Id. § 362(a).
52. Id § 541.
53. Id. §§ 704, 1106(a), 1107.
54. Id. § 726.
55. Id. § 1129.
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who request or suffer bankruptcy relief and whose property is liqui-
dated for the benefit of their creditors are permitted to be discharged
from their debts and to retain some property, as well as all earned
income acquired after the bankruptcy filing date, so as to have a "fresh
start."' 56 However, the Code assumes that artificial entities have no
such right to retain property or to be automatically discharged. There
is no purpose in a "fresh start" for an artificial entity whose assets are
to be liquidated for the benefit of creditors. If the owners wish to form
a new business venture, they can do so, after simply abandoning the
unsuccessful prior attempt.
As outlined above, the Code provides a structure and organiza-
tion for distribution to creditors in an equitable manner of the assets
and income of a business entity, whether a sole proprietorship, part-
nership, or corporation, which has become subject to bankruptcy
court jurisdiction by the entry of an "order for relief" under sections
301, 302, or 303 of the Code.57 Generally, a business bankruptcy will
be handled under chapter 7 of title 11, providing for liquidation of
business assets by a trustee, who distributes the proceeds to creditors
according to statutory priorities,58 or under chapter 11 of title 11,
which contemplates that the business will continue in existence.
Chapter 11 provides for the payment to creditors, usually over time, of
an amount acceptable to the requisite majority of creditors and at least
equal to that available in a chapter 7 liquidation.5 9
A chapter 7 liquidation proceeding represents the termination of
the business and the extinguishment of the debtor as a going concern.
In a chapter 7 proceeding, all assets of the debtor are turned over to an
independent trustee whose function it is to liquidate the available as-
sets to pay claims of creditors to the extent possible.6 Though a cor-
poration which is liquidated under chapter 7 does not cease to exist as
a corporation, it becomes an "empty shell" from which all assets of
56. Id. §§ 541, 707, 1141, 1328.
57. Id. §§ 301-303.
58. Id. §§ 507, 726.
59. Section 1129(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides, in part:
(a) The court shall confirm a plan only if all of the following requirements
are met:
(7) With respect to each impaired class of claims or interests -
(A) each holder of a claim or interest of such class -
(i) has accepted the plan; or
(ii) will receive or retain under the plan on account of such
claim or interest property of a value, as of the effective date of
the plan, that is not less than the amount that such holder
would so receive or retain if the debtor were liquidated under
chapter 7 of this title on such date; ....
Id. § 1129(a).
60. Id. § 704.
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
value have been removed and which, therefore, cannot function eco-
nomically in the future. A corporation does not receive a discharge in
a chapter 7 liquidation proceeding, so any assets it might acquire after
the bankruptcy case is concluded are subject to the claims of creditors
who have not been satisfied through the bankruptcy process.61 For
this reason, a corporation which is subjected to chapter 7 relief will be
abandoned by its owners, whose investment will have been lost.
Chapter 11 of the Code is designed to promote reorganization, as
opposed to liquidation, of the business. Chapter 11 also furthers the
socially useful goals of promoting employment and preventing the dis-
ruption caused by a major business collapse. In addition, if the busi-
ness can become profitable over a period of time, more funds can be
generated for creditor payments under a chapter 11 reorganization
proceeding than is possible in a liquidation. Liquidation frequently
causes the distress sale of assets in a "fire sale" atmosphere or causes
the foreclosure on assets subject to secured creditors' liens, with no
value derived for unsecured creditors. In a reorganization under chap-
ter 11, the primary function, which must be fulfilled before any other
goals can be achieved, is payment of creditors' claims, at least to the
extent that claims would be paid in a liquidation under chapter 7.62
While a chapter 11 proceeding may involve a trustee, the debtor gener-
ally conducts its own reorganization, serves as its own trustee, and has
many of the statutory powers of an independent trustee appointed to
take charge of the debtor's property and affairs. In the usual chapter
11 case, the debtor remains in possession of the assets of the bank-
ruptcy estate and is, therefore, referred to as a "debtor-in-
possession."'63
To a considerable degree, the goals and values embodied in the
Bankruptcy Code conflict with those reflected in ANCSA. The Bank-
ruptcy Code creates a complex but systematic ordering of creditors'
claims, but gives relatively scant attention to equity-holders' (includ-
ing shareholders') interests. Further, the Bankruptcy Code accords
payment of creditors' claims a higher priority than protection of the
value of shareholders' stock;64 ANCSA, as amended, inverts this pref-
erence by protecting ANCSA stock and ANCSA land from certain
61. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (1982).
62. The precondition for plan confirmation cannot be waived except by the af-
fected creditor, even if other creditors are willing to take less than a liquidation pay-
ment in order to see that the business continues. See supra note 59. The same test is
applicable to bankruptcies of individuals with regular incomes, usually wage earners,
filed under chapter 13 of the Code, and family farmers. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1325(a)(4)
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
63. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101(1), 1107 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
64. See text accompanying notes 189-200.
[Vol. 6:73
1989] BANKRUPTCY OF NATIVE CORPORATIONS 91
voluntary and involuntary conveyances and creditors' claims. 65 The
byzantine complexity of ANCSA's provisions regarding the issuance
and transfer of stock stands in stark contrast to its sometimes incom-
plete treatment of creditors' claims. Indeed, ANCSA as originally en-
acted, practically ignored the powerful role played by debt-holders of
a corporation.
These two statutory schemes value the rights of the debt-holders
as compared to the equity-holders quite differently. Many of the
Bankruptcy Code's most fundamental underlying assumptions about
corporations (that is, voluntary creation, capitalization for the purpose
of investing risk capital, performance measured entirely by financial
indicators, no need for a fresh start because a new entity can be cre-
ated) do not apply to Native corporations at all. Indeed, ANCSA, and
its amendments, can be viewed as a progression of efforts to protect
Native corporations from creditors' claims and the threat of non-Na-
tive control in order to fulfill Congress' promise of just compensation
for extinguishment of Alaska Natives' aboriginal claims.66 The stock
transfer restrictions contained in ANCSA as enacted in 1971, the land
bank provisions contained in the 1980 amendments, and the automatic
land bank provisions and stock inalienability extensions of the 1987
amendments were all specifically designed to insulate the corporations
and their shareholders from free market and creditor pressures. Thus,
as amended, ANCSA attempts to provide Alaska Native corporations
with the flexibility to enter the marketplace on the one hand, and pro-
tect some of their assets from loss on the other.
Bankruptcy is the acid test of whether the dominant culture will,
in fact, permit the Alaska Native people to maintain the basis for a
lifestyle outside the mainstream of the cash economy, while also giving
them a chance at the brass ring offered by a capitalistic society. In the
context of a bankruptcy, creditors of the Native corporation, relying
upon the explicit provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and the policies
implicit in the Code, will seek to apply the assets and income of the
65. Section 7(h) of ANCSA makes ANCSA stock nontransferable. 43 U.S.C.
§ 1606(h) (1982). As discussed infra, this provision may override the Bankruptcy
Code's absolute priority rule which in certain circumstances permits creditors to ex-
tinguish stockholders' interests in a chapter 11 debtor corporation if creditors' claims
are not paid in full. See text accompanying notes 189-200. ANCSA as originally
enacted provided that the stock restrictions would expire in 1991; the 1987 amend-
ments extend these restrictions indefinitely until the ANCSA corporation chooses
otherwise. See text accompanying note 47. ANCSA section 11, as enacted in 1970
and amended in 1987, protects certain undeveloped land owned by ANCSA corpora-
tions from creditors' claims. 43 U.S.C. § 1610 (1982); see text accompanying note
109. Additionally, ANCSA section 21(d) exempts certain undeveloped land from real
property taxation. 43 U.S.C. § 1620(d) (1982).
66. See supra note 2.
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Native corporation to their claims. The shareholders and manage-
ment of the Native corporation, on the other hand, will rely on
ANCSA's purposes and legislative language to support their desire to
preserve the corporate existence and minimize creditor payments so
that the debtor will continue to fulfill its functions as provided in
ANCSA. 67 When an ANCSA corporation enters the bankruptcy pro-
cess, these tensions must be resolved. 68
II. PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE
A. Introduction
Central to the organization and resolution of a bankruptcy case is
the concept of "property of the estate" as defined in section 541 of the
Bankruptcy Code. 69 A bankruptcy case is commenced and the bank-
ruptcy estate is created upon the debtor's filing a voluntary petition in
the United States Bankruptcy Court.70 With limited exceptions, the
estate consists of all legal or equitable interests in property owned by
the debtor at the commencement of the case and any interest in prop-
erty acquired by the debtor's estate thereafter. The estate's property
comes under the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and is potentially
67. In resolving these conflicts, courts will give considerable weight to the status
of ANCSA as "Indian legislation." Section 2(a) of the 1987 amendments to ANCSA
recites that "the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act and this Act are Indian legisla-
tion enacted by Congress pursuant to its plenary authority under the Constitution of
the United States to regulate Indian affairs." 43 U.S.C.A. § 1601(9) (West Supp.
1988). This is very strong language. The United States Supreme Court has recog-
nized a canon of construction that Indian legislation (defined as legislation intended to
benefit Indians) is to be construed liberally in favor of Indians, and ambiguities in non-
Indian legislation are to be resolved in favor of Indians. See Alaska Pac. Fisheries v.
United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918); F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW 275-76 (1982).
68. A related topic was analyzed by a commentator, discussing the difficulty in
harmonizing the realities of Alaska Native lifestyles and the purposes of ANCSA cor-
porations with the demands of the Model Business Corporation Act. Branson, Square
Pegs in Round Holes: Alaska Native Claims Settlement Corporations under Corporate
Law, 8 UCLA-ALAsKA L. REv. 103 (1979).
69. Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code provides, in part:
(a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title
creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property,
wherever located and by whomever held:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all legal
or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of
the case.
11 U.S.C. § 541 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
70. 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1982). The bankruptcy estate may also be created upon the
entry of an "order for relief" (that is, a determination that bankruptcy administration
should proceed) in an involuntary case. 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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subject to distribution to creditors and other third parties. In a chap-
ter 7 liquidation case, the concept of property of the estate defines the
property which the trustee is required to collect and reduce to money
under section 704 of the Code.71 In a chapter 11 reorganization, it is
the property which the trustee or debtor-in-possession may manage,
sell, or utilize in a plan of reorganization under section 1123.72 Any
trustee appointed in a chapter 7 case must determine the scope of the
estate available for payment of creditors' claims and expenses of ad-
ministration in the bankruptcy case. In a chapter 11 reorganization,
determination of the property of the estate is equally essential, as the
amount which can, or must, be paid under a plan of reorganization
cannot otherwise be known. Under section 1129(a)(7), no plan can be
confirmed unless the court determines that each creditor who has
voted against the plan will receive payment at least equal to the
amount available to that creditor in a chapter 7 liquidation.73
Any corporate reorganization proceeding involves explicit or im-
plicit bargaining between the debtor and the contending groups of
creditors. This negotiation cannot be effectively carried out unless
there is general agreement concerning the assets of the debtor available
for distribution.
For an "ordinary" debtor corporation, ascertaining the contents
of a bankruptcy estate usually is neither difficult nor controversial.
The estate in the typical corporate bankruptcy is usually all-encom-
passing, and its composition under most circumstances may be taken
for granted. With a Native corporation, the questions are more intri-
cate. Moreover, the answers may compromise or destroy the ability of
the corporation to fulfill the functions intended for it under ANCSA.
Native corporations possess a wide variety of property, both real
and personal. The initial capitalization of Native corporations derived
71. Section 704 provides, in part, as follows:
The trustee shall -
(1) collect and reduce to money the property of the estate for which such
trustee serves, and close such estate as expeditiously as is compatible with
the best interests of the parties in interest; ....
11 U.S.C. § 704 (1982).
72. Section 1123, entitled "Contents of Plan," provides, in part:
(a) Notwithstanding any otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy law, a plan
shall -
(5) provide adequate means for the plan's implementation, such as -
(D) sale of all or any part of the property of the estate, either subject to or
free of any lien, or the distribution of all or any part of the property of the
estate among those having an interest in such property of the estate; ....
Id. § 1123.
73. Id. § 1129(a)(7).
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entirely from transfers of land and cash from the federal govern-
ment, 74 and much of the property received was subject to unique and
often complex statutory conditions. In addition, ANCSA, as
amended, contains a number of provisions affecting the rights of credi-
tors of Native corporations, which may in turn affect the composition
of the bankruptcy estate. Defining the property of a Native corpora-
tion's bankruptcy estate requires the examination of these provisions
of ANCSA, together with relevant commercial and bankruptcy law.
The problem in defining property of a Native corporation's bank-
ruptcy estate arises both with its land and with cash income received
from the land and from other corporations.
In contrast to non-Native corporations, the property of Native
corporations can at times lie beyond the reach of creditors. ANCSA,
as amended, has made this automatic under certain circumstances for
certain types of assets (for example, undeveloped land). In addition,
Native corporations have the option of voluntarily placing assets be-
yond the reach of their creditors if they take steps prescribed in the
statute for establishment of a settlement trust.75 At the opposite end
of the spectrum, corporation property such as general revenue appears
to be no different from an asset owned by any non-Native corporation
and would presumably come within a creditor's reach.
The concept of "exempt assets" in a corporate bankruptcy is
unique to Native corporations. Outside of ANCSA, only individuals,
as opposed to artificial business entities such as corporations, can pos-
sess property immune from creditors' claims. Unfortunately, ANCSA
prescribes few details concerning the implementation of the exemption
provisions, especially in the context of a bankruptcy.
Many of the protections from the risks of the marketplace af-
forded Native corporations have come in amendments to ANCSA, en-
acted as members of Congress, Alaska Natives, and others became
increasingly concerned that the Alaska Native settlement might be lost
through creditor action. These amendments have sought to facilitate
the maintenance of Native control over Native property and, in partic-
ular, Native land.
B. Land Issues
1. Undeveloped Land. Acting under its plenary authority to reg-
ulate Indian affairs, 76 Congress recently enacted amendments to
ANCSA ("the 1991 Amendments") affording sweeping protection to
74. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1605, 1613 (1982).
75. See supra note 47.
76. See Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act Amendments of 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-241 § 2(9), 101 Stat. 1788 (1988); 133 CONG. REC. S15,405 (daily ed. Oct. 29,
1987).
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undeveloped lands held by Native corporations. 77 Alaska Congress-
man Don Young, a sponsor of the legislation, stated in urging its pas-
sage in the House of Representatives:
H.R. 278 is intended to correct a serious flaw in the Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act of 1971 - a flaw which threatens the intent
of that act by allowing the loss of land owned by Alaska Natives.
This flaw will be corrected through passage of this legislation .... 78
Indeed, at the outset of the hearings in the 99th Congress which
ultimately led to the 1991 Amendments, Young announced that his
main goal as Congressman for the State of Alaska was to make sure
that the land that was granted to the Alaska Natives would still belong
to Alaska Natives after 1991.79 The theme of protection for Native
lands echoed throughout the proceedings leading to passage of the
1991 Amendments.80
77. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1636 (West Supp. 1988).
78. 133 CONG. REc. Hll,933 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1987).
79. Oversight Hearings on the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act Before the
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1985).
80. In its report on the proposed amendments, the Senate Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources stated:
Another concern is that many of the Regional, Village and Urban Corpora-
tions and Native Groups do not have sufficient cash and natural resources to
become and remain economically viable and that, consequently, title to lands
owned by Native Corporations which remain in Native control will be lost
involuntarily. Section 21(d) of ANCSA currently exempts Native Corpora-
tion land which has not been developed or leased from State and local prop-
erty taxation for 20 years after the date of conveyance. Section 21(d)
implicitly assumes that 20 years after the date of conveyance all undeveloped
Native Corporation land, including tens of millions of acres of land which is
only valuable as wildlife habitat needed to support the continuation of the
Native subsistence economy, will be sufficiently integrated into the non-Na-
tive economy to generate sufficient revenue to pay a property tax, or, if it is
not, that the Native Corporation which owns the land will be able to pay the
tax with money earned from other sources. In addition, nothing in section
21(d) presently protects Native Corporation land from involuntarily passing
out of Native ownership to pay creditors in bankruptcy proceedings, or
through adverse possession.
Finally, concern was expressed that the for-profit corporation may not
always be the only appropriate form of legal entity to implement the settle-
ment in all regions and all villages. Some corporations have done a remarka-
ble job of using their portions of the land and money settlement to advance
the well-being of Native people in their respective geographic regions. Other
corporations, particularly small village corporations, have experienced con-
siderably more difficulty.
These difficulties have arisen due to several factors. First, Village Cor-
porations were drastically undercapitalized. Although $962.5 million is a
significant sum of money, when paid out over a number of years and divided
among 13 Regional Corporations, over 200 Village Corporations, and over
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The provisions, known as the "automatic land bank provisions,"
which deal with undeveloped land appear in section 11 of the 1991
Amendments, which provides:
(d) AUTOMATIC PROTECTIONS FOR LANDS CONVEYED
PURSUANT TO THE ALASKA NATIVE CLAIMS SETTLE-
MENT ACT.-(1)(A) Notwithstanding any other provisions of law
or doctrine of equity, all land and interests in land in Alaska con-
veyed by the Federal Government pursuant to the Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act to a Native individual or Native Corporation
or subsequently reconveyed by a Native Corporation pursuant to
section 39 of that Act to a Settlement Trust shall be exempt, so long
as such land and interests are not developed or leased or sold to third
parties from -
(i) adverse possession and similar claims based upon estoppel;
(ii) real property taxes by any government entity;
(iii) judgments resulting from a claim based upon or arising
under -
(I) Title 11 of the United States Code or any successor
statute,
(II) other insolvency or moratorium laws, or
(III) other laws generally affecting creditors' rights;
(iv) judgments in any action at law or in equity to recover
sums owed or penalties incurred by a Native Corporation or
Settlement Trust or any employee, officer, director, or share-
holder of such corporation or trust, unless this exemption is
contractually waived prior to the commencement of such ac-
tion; and
(v) involuntary distributions or conveyances related to the in-
voluntary dissolution of a Native Corporation or Settlement
Trust.,,
80,000 individual Natives, the average Village Corporation received very lit-
tle money. In addition to undercapitalization, at the time ANCSA was en-
acted, many individuals who later served as officers, employees, or members
of the boards of directors had little experience dealing with the corporate
form of organization or the business world. The lack of a private cash econ-
omy in much of rural Alaska compounded the problem. Most Native vil-
lages are sited at locations which enable village residents to participate in the
subsistence hunting, fishing and gathering economy, not the cash economy.
In addition to the problems already discussed, a number of Native wit-
nesses who appeared before the Committee testified that they and many
other Alaska Natives, particularly those who live in isolated rural villages
who participate in the subsistence hunting, fishing and gathering economy,
feel that the social and human values embodied in the corporate form of
organization frequently conflict with traditional Native values and Alaska's
traditional Native cultures.
H.R. 278, as ordered reported, seeks to address these and other con-
cerns regarding the implementation of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement
Act.
S. RF-P. No. 201, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21 (1987).
81. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1636 (West Supp. 1988) (emphasis added).
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Like its conceptual antecedent section 21(d) 82 which exempted
Native corporation lands from real property taxation in 1971, section
1l's protections are tied to the factual condition of the lands in ques-
tion, that is, whether they are "developed," "leased," or "sold."' 83 Sec-
tion 11 of the 1991 Amendments defines "developed" and "leased"
84
and specifically precludes a trustee, receiver, or custodian (including,
presumably, a trustee in a bankruptcy case) from assigning, leasing,
developing or conveying any land or interests in land exempt from
creditor action under section 907 of the Alaska National Interest Land
Conservation Act ("ANILCA"), as amended.85 This condition will
prevent a bankruptcy trustee from destroying the protection from
creditor action or including undeveloped land in a bankruptcy estate
by changing its character.
While the purpose of subsection 11(d), providing that ANCSA
lands shall be exempt from "judgment resulting from or claims based
upon or arising under ... (I) title 11 of the United States Code [the
Bankruptcy Code] or any successor statute,"' 86 may have been to ex-
clude undeveloped land from a Native corporation's bankruptcy es-
tate, the language is singularly ill-chosen. A debtor's assets are part of
the debtor's bankruptcy estate under section 541 of the Code without
any "judgment" being entered to that effect, and claims of creditors in
a bankruptcy case are "based upon" and "arise under" substantive
non-bankruptcy law; they are not "based upon," nor do they "arise
under" the Bankruptcy Code.87 The Bankruptcy Code provides the
procedural vehicle for satisfying those claims when bankruptcy relief
is sought by or imposed upon the debtor.
Congress could have excluded the undeveloped land from a bank-
ruptcy estate by expressly providing for the exclusion. Instead, the
imprecision of the enacted language, coupled with the broad inclusions
82. 43 U.S.C. § 1620(d) (1982).
83. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1636(d)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1988). The difficulty with defining
"development" and "leasing" is pointed out in a Federal-State Land Use Planning
Commission for Alaska Study, which notes that "development" can be slight or ma-
jor, can encompass a large or a small area, and that "leasing," as for a recreational
purpose, may not alter the character of the land at all. Price, Purtich & Gerber, The
Tax Exemption of Native Lands Under Section 21(d) of the Alaska Native Claims Set-
tlement Act, 6 UCLA-ALASKA L. Rav. (1976).
84. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1636(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1988).
85. Id. § 1636.
86. The concept of a case "arising under" or "arising in" the Bankruptcy Code
has been utilized in the jurisdictional provisions of the Judicial Code, which confer
jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters in the district courts. The district courts have
"original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or
arising in or related to cases under title 11." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(b) (West Supp.
1988).
87. Id.
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found in section 541, at least gives the opportunity for Native corpora-
tion trustees or creditors to contend that no exclusion from an estate
was intended, only exclusion from "judgments." ' s Still, it is hard to
see what else Congress could reasonably have intended by the refer-
ence to title 11 of the United States Code, and it is certain that all
Native corporations seeking bankruptcy relief will contend that their
unencumbered, undeveloped land is to be excluded from the estate.8 9
Prior to the amendments, protection for undeveloped lands
against general unsecured creditors and real property taxation was
88. While certain types of judgments, such as judgments to deny a discharge or
determine the nondischargeability of a debt are entered by bankruptcy courts, and
may be said to be "based upon title 11 of the United States Code in that they are
entered based on the bankruptcy law, itself, and not upon substantive non-bankruptcy
law," this type ofjudgment represents a fairly narrow spectrum of the claims routinely
dealt with in bankruptcy cases. It is unlikely that Congress intended the automatic
land bank exceptions to apply to only this limited group ofjudgments. See 11 U.S.C.
§§ 523, 727 (1982).
89. There is no official conference committee report covering the final compro-
mise reached between the House of Representatives and the Senate on the 1991
Amendments. However, sponsors of the legislation jointly submitted a description
and analysis of the House-Senate compromise bill which is included in both the House
floor debate and Senate floor debate accepting the compromise. 133 CONG. REC.
Hi 1,936 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1987) (joint analysis submitted by Congressmen Udall and
Young); 133 CONG. REc. S18,702 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1987) (analysis submitted by
Senators Murkowski and Stevens). See also S. REP. No. 201, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987); H.R. REP. No. 31, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); S. REP. No. 201, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1986).
The Report of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs on H.R. 4162 (a
predecessor bill to the final compromise bill, in the 99th Congress) states:
Subparagraph A [of section 13 of the bill] provides that lands conveyed to
Native individuals or entities under ANCSA shall, from the date of that
conveyance, be immune from certain legal processes as long as such lands
are not developed or leased to third parties or are used solely for purposes of
exploration. These processes include adverse possession and similar claims;
real property taxes; judgments resulting from bankruptcy and similar laws;
judgments in any action at law or in equity to recover sums owed or penal-
ties incurred by any Native Corporation or Group or their representatives,
unless such immunity is waived in a contract executed prior to the com-
mencement of such action; and involuntary dissolution.
While mindful of the need to protect Native corporations from the in-
voluntary loss of undeveloped lands, most of which are used for subsistence
purposes, the Committee does not intend to interfere with normal business
relations. Thus, the immunity under the Bankruptcy Code will not affect
secured creditors, whose lien will take the land out of the Land Bank, but
rather will curtail only the interests of unsecured creditors, who did not look
to the land as a source of repayment in the first place.
In view of the lack of progress of land bank agreements under existing
authorities, the Committee has chosen to adopt these statutory protections
in addition to existing elective land bank authorities.
H.R. REP. No. 712, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1986).
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available through the Alaska Land Bank program established in 1980,
with passage of ANILCA.90 Protection against state and local real
property taxation was also provided under section 21(d) of ANCSA
for Native corporation land which was not developed or leased. How-
ever, this protection lasted only twenty years. 91
Under the land bank program, set forth in section 907 of
ANILCA,92 persons or entities who received land under ANCSA
could enter into an agreement with the Secretary of the Interior,93
whereby they would manage their land in a restricted manner and
would then receive protection for the land from claims of adverse pos-
session, property taxes, and unsecured claims against the owner. The
tax protections ceased if the lands were leased or developed.94 Use of
the ANILCA land bank as a means of freeing land from creditor ac-
tion was a mixed blessing because as long as the land was so held its
management was restricted and had to be coordinated with manage-
ment of nearby federal lands. Thus, the owner may have been pre-
vented from using the land for the economic benefit of the
shareholders and the region. Since the land bank concept was enacted
in 1980 and until the enactment of the 1991 Amendments, only a few
corporations entered into agreements with the Department of the Inte-
rior. The administration of the program was cumbersome and
costly. 95
Under the provisions of the 1991 Amendments, agreements with
the federal government were no longer required for Native corpora-
tions to obtain land bank protections.96 So long as the lands are not
developed, leased, or sold, they are protected. Thus, with the 1991
Amendments, Congress intended to offer greater protection and im-
pose fewer restraints on Native lands than existed under ANILCA.97
90. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1636 (West Supp. 1988).
91. 43 U.S.C. § 1620(d) (1982).
92. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1636(d) (West Supp. 1988). "Land bank" status was automatic
for the first three years after conveyance of the land.
93. Id. §§ 1636(c)(2), (d).
94. Id. § 1636(c)(2)(B).
95. S. REP. No. 201, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1987).
96. Donald C. Mitchell, counsel to the Alaska Federation of Natives ("AFN"),
urged in a 1984 briefing paper to AFN that Congress should consider making the land
bank program automatic rather than requiring a burdensome agreement before the
land could be protected. Mitchell, Analysis of the Provisions in the Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act Relating to Land Protection, in ALASKA FEDERATION OF NA-
TIVES, INC., 1991: A LEGAL ANALYSIS (Oct. 1984).
97. The reason Natives became more desirous of protection for the undeveloped
land was stated by Byron Mallott, President of Sealaska Corporation:
And the land was placed in the corporations without really an apprecia-
tion, I believe, of what the corporations were and what they could do, be-
cause the corporations are essentially a business machine.... Their entire
history in law, in precedent, in myth, in reality has 99 percent to do with
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There is room for disagreement as to the extent of the 1991 auto-
matic land bank protection; that is, whether it applies to all claims or
simply those that arose after the 1991 Amendments were signed into
law.98 ANCSA afforded no protection at all for ANCSA land from
general creditors' claims until, as noted above, the enactment of
ANILCA and its land bank provisions in 1980. The 1991 Amend-
ments made protection for undeveloped land automatic.
Congressman Don Young's floor statement states explicitly that
the 1991 land bank protections apply to any creditors' claims that
arise after 1980:
As enacted in 1980, Section 907 of the ANILCA established
the Congressional policy that Native and Native corporation land
should not be involuntarily lost as a result of the execution of judg-
ments based on claims of creditors which arose either before or after
December 2, 1980, or of insolvency or bankruptcy proceedings.
For that reason, Section 907 authorized Natives and Native
corporations to protect undeveloped land from creditors by execut-
ing a land bank agreement without regard to whether executing the
agreement might render the Native or Native corporation insolvent.
In that regard, to the extent the execution of a land bank agreement
might otherwise have violated 11 U.S.C. 548, A.S. 34.40.010, or
other laws generally affecting creditors' rights, Section 907, as origi-
nally enacted, superseded such statutes insofar as they might other-
wise have applied to void the execution of such an agreement.
The automatic extension of the land protection immunities af-
forded by this section reaffirms this important Congressional policy.
As a matter of law, the section automatically protects Natives and
Native corporation land from claims of creditors which arose either
before or after December 2, 1980, from the execution of judgments
based on such claims, and supersedes title 11 of the United States
Code, other State and federal insolvency and moratorium laws and
making money and adhering to the P and L [profit and loss] and, maybe, one
percent the ability to influence and to change and to impact public policy as
it affects the social course of a people or a nation.
And the land, by that act, by the act of putting the land into the corpo-
rations, the land became an economic asset, under law, under every other
imaginable understanding of what it means to place an asset into a for-profit
business corporation. And so immediately we were on a divergent course as
to how the land could best be utilized and how best it could be maintained
on behalf of Native people for the long-term future.
Because that's not what the land was for. The land was not viewed as
an economic asset. It was viewed as the touchstone and the basis from
which Native people could maintain their value systems and their cultures
and all those things that have brought us to where we're at today.
3 ROUNDTABLE DIscussIoNs, supra note 24, at 202-03.
98. The authors of this article are in disagreement on this issue.
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all other State and federal laws generally affecting creditors'
rights.9 9
Creditors seeking to avoid this result will assert that the language
of section 907(d)(6) of ANILCA, as amended by the 1991 Amend-
ments, proscribes such an interpretation. That clause reads: "No pro-
vision of this subsection shall be construed to impair, or otherwise
affect, any valid contract or other obligation that was entered into
prior to February 3, 1988 [the date of the enactment of the Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act Amendments of 1987].1°°
As a practical matter, the automatic land bank protections of sec-
tion 11 will create procedural and management issues to be addressed
by prospective debtors in chapter 11 reorganization proceedings, who
will at the same time become debtors-in-possession. A debtor-in-pos-
session is required by the Bankruptcy Code to act as trustee for the
benefit of its creditors in the management of the bankruptcy estate.10 '
On the other hand, the debtor-in-possession in a Native corporation
bankruptcy remains the owner of undeveloped land, outside the estate,
with management and supervision responsibilities for that property as
well. However, with the possible exception of revenues derived from
sources defined in sections 7(i) and 7(j) of ANCSA, 10 2 the debtor cor-
poration's resources of cash are subjected to the restrictions of the
Bankruptcy Code. It can be expected that the creditors of the estate
will resist the expenditure of estate funds or the cost of the use of
debtor personnel to manage the undeveloped land from which the
creditors cannot benefit. These creditors may seek the appointment of
a trustee to prevent the misapplication of estate resources on non-es-
tate assets.
If a trustee is appointed in a chapter 11 case, and if the trustee
heeds the creditors' wishes and does not try to administer the land
from which the creditors are statutorily excluded, then presumably the
board of directors of the corporation will have control over, and may
select or manage, the Native corporation's undeveloped land. Be-
cause, however, all the income-generating assets of the debtor, with
the possible exception of section 7(i) or 7(j) revenue, 10 3 will be under
the trustee's control, the undeveloped land may, as a practical matter,
be neglected until the reorganization is completed and the property
and income of the estate are returned to the debtor.
99. 133 CONG. RPc. H1,938 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1987) (statement of Congress-
man Young).
100. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1636(d)(6)(A) (West Supp. 1988).
101. 11 U.S.C. § 1108 (1983).
102. See infra text accompanying notes 140-52.
103. Id.
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If the reorgnization fails and the chapter 11 case is converted to a
case under chapter 7, or if a chapter 7 case is originally filed by or
against a Native corporation, the conflict presented by the recent auto-
matic land protections and the "dual" nature of the debtor becomes
even more pronounced. A typical chapter 7 case, as outlined above,
contemplates the functional extinction of the corporate or partnership
debtor, yet it does not cause the literal extinction of the entity, which
will survive chapter 7 as a shell without assets but with continued lia-
bilities to the extent unsatisfied by the bankruptcy case.' °4 If a Native
corporation undergoes a chapter 7 proceeding, the trustee will sell or
transfer to creditors all assets other than the undeveloped land, and
possibly the section 7(i) or 7(j) revenue, and will then ask the bank-
ruptcy court to close the case. The debtor will still exist and will still
own its undeveloped land, but unless section 7(i) or 70) revenues are
exempt, it will have no money with which to operate and will, thus,
have no functioning organization or employees with which to manage
the land. 10 5 As the corporation will not have been discharged from its
debts, it will not be able to develop or lease its properties in the future,
even assuming it could find the means to do so, because the developed
or leased land would then become available to unpaid creditors, who
could then seek renewed bankruptcy proceedings in order to have that
property administered for their benefit. 106
It can, therefore, be concluded that while the 1991 Amendments
have provided Native corporations with some protection from the rig-
ors of bankruptcy proceedings, they may have done so at the price of
making undeveloped land essentially undevelopable unless and until
creditors have been paid or have consented to the development. This
result neither furthers the goals of ANCSA nor satisfies desires for an
efficient and orderly mechanism for payment of the corporations'
debts. Further legislation in this area is needed.
2. Selected Land. Regional and village corporations receive fed-
eral land pursuant to sections 12107 and 14108 of ANCSA. They are
entitled to select land from federal lands which have been withdrawn
from the public domain under section 11 of ANCSA.109 The selection
104. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1983).
105. If a Native corporation was sufficiently prescient to place revenue-generating
assets or the land itself in a settlement trust, these problems might be avoided. See
supra note 47.
106. 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1982).
107. 43 U.S.C. § 1611 (1982).
108. Id. § 1613.
109. Id. § 1610.
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process is governed by ANCSA and regulations promulgated and ad-
ministered by the Department of the Interior.110 ANCSA requires
that selections have been made by the Native corporations within the
three years following enactment of the Act."1 The corporations' se-
lections are subject to approval of the Department of the Interior,
which is charged with identifying third party claims and easements on
the lands and, also, with their survey and the issuance of patents. The
ANCSA land conveyance process has been extraordinarily slow.112
Because of delays in land conveyancing, Native corporations may
file for bankruptcy with some of their land entitlement still outstand-
ing. Lands selected but not yet conveyed by patent or interim convey-
ance1 13 cannot be sold, leased, mortgaged, or developed by a regional
110. 43 C.F.R. §§ 2650.0-1-2655.4 (1987).
111. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1611, 1615(b) (1982); 43 C.F.R. §§ 2651.3, 2652.2 (1987).
112. As of December 31, 1983, 27 million acres of the ANCSA corporations' enti-
tlement had been transferred by interim conveyance, and 4 million acres had been
patented, for a total of 70% of the ANCSA corporations' entitlement. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR - ALASKA
LAND CONVEYANCE PROGRAM - A SLOW, COMPLEX AND COSTLY PROCESS 8
(June 12, 1984).
The delays in the land conveyance process and the unfortunate consequences
were the focus of many days of hearings prior to the passage of ANILCA, prompting
hard questioning of government officials. See S. REP. No. 413, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
236 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5070, 5180 (despite
Congress' directive of an early transfer of title, the Natives collectively have not been
able to acquire title to more than 5 million of their 44 million acre entitlement, 7 years
after the enactment of ANCSA); Oversight Hearings Before the Comm. on Interior and
Insular Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (statement of Congressman Seiberling)
("Some deference must be given to the shortness of life.").
113. A conveyance under ANCSA may be by interim conveyance or patent,
whichever occurs first. 43 C.F.R. § 2650.0-50) (1987), 43 U.S.C. § 16210) (1982).
An "interim conveyance" transfers legal title of unsurveyed land under ANCSA from
the federal government to a Native corporation prior to survey. 43 C.F.R. § 2650.0-
5(h) (1987).
The vast acreage and remote location of much of the selected land has combined
with the limited funds available for surveys to make the final patent of all ANCSA-
selected lands a distant goal. Approximately 35 million acres have been conveyed out
of the 44 million to be conveyed, of which about 7 million has been by patent, as of the
writing of this article. The Bureau of Land Management presently estimates it will
take another 20 years to complete survey and patent of Native corporation land, if
present funding levels continue. Interview with Robert Arndorfer, Deputy State Di-
rector, Cadastral Survey, Bureau of Land Management, Dep't of the Interior (Feb. 25,
1989).
ANCSA corporations have treated interim-conveyed land as owned in fee simple;
they have mortgaged, sold, and developed the lands, treating them as freely alienable.
See 43 U.S.C. § 16210)(1) (1982). For example, the plan of reorganization in the
Bering Straights Native Corporation ("BSNC") bankruptcy, No. 2-86-00002 (Bankr.
D. Alaska fied Mar. 5, 1986), requires the transfer of land from BSNC to village
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or village corporation.1 14 However, once it has been selected, the cor-
poration possesses certain rights to the land, primarily the right to
receive it in the future assuming no superior entitlements prevail over
the selection.' 15
If the lands would otherwise be part of the bankruptcy estate, the
right to receive the land should also pass to the bankruptcy estate, as
should the land once conveyed, even if the conveyance occurs after a
bankruptcy case has been commenced.116 In fact, a chapter 7 case
could not be fully administered until all selected lands have been re-
ceived and disposed of, or until the trustee has determined that the
effort and expense of doing so is not justified by any return which
could be reasonably anticipated; in this case, the trustee will seek court
corporation creditors. Much of this land has been transferred to BSNC by interim
conveyance, not by patent.
Under these conditions, it is difficult to see why lands conveyed by interim con-
veyance would not be part of a bankruptcy estate subject to the automatic land bank
protection discussed above.
114. 43 U.S.C. § 1621(i); Cape Fox Corp. v. United States, 456 F. Supp. 784, 801,
804 (D. Alaska 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 646 F.2d 399 (9th Cir. 1981); Cape Fox
Corp. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 223 (1983).
115. See 43 U.S.C. § 1621(i) (1982). See also Cape Fox Corp. v. United States, 456
F. Supp. 784, 808 (D. Alaska 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 646 F.2d 399 (9th Cir.
1981).
116. Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code provides, in part:
(a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 302 or 303 of this title
creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property
wherever located and by whomever held:
(6) Proceeds, product, offspring, rents or profits of or from property of the
estate, except such as are earnings from services performed by an individual
debtor after the commencement of the case.
(7) Any interest in property that the estate acquires after the commence-
ment of the case.
11 U.S.C. § 541 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
However, in the Report of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs on the
Haida Land Exchange Act of 1986, the Committee stated that certain land exchange
rights were meant only to benefit Haida Corporation and not a successor.
At the same time, the Committee is well aware that Haida Corporation
is already experiencing economic difficulties, and also that the Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act presently provides that the restrictions on alienability
of shares of Village Corporations such as Haida Corporation will end prior
to January 1, 1995. The Committee has already addressed that situation in
other legislation reported in this Congress. With respect to this bill, the
Committee stresses that H.R. 5353 is an offer to Haida Corporation and to
Sealaska Corporation as Native Corporations under the Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act. Should their status change, the Committee would
expect to reevaluate the desirability of this bill, including the provisions of
section 10.
H.R. RFP. No. 930, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1986).
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approval to abandon the remaining property or right to receive it
under section 554 of the Bankruptcy Code. 1 7
Whether the trustee, as the representative of the debtor, should
also have the power to deal with the federal agencies reviewing the
land selections made by the debtor pre-petition and set the corpora-
tion's priorities among the lands selected is a more difficult question.
Given Congress' enactment of automatic protections for undeveloped
land and the strong likelihood that the newly conveyed land will be
undeveloped, such land will probably be exempt from creditors'
claims. Thus, it is likely that a trustee will seek to abandon unselected
lands from the estate. The right to receive conveyance of the lands
will then revert to the debtor, although the debtor may be without
means to carry out the steps necessary to complete the process if all of
the debtor's funds are held by the trustee. Without funds, the debtor
will be unable to hire employees to negotiate with federal agencies,
analyze possible selection priorities, or manage the land once
conveyed.
If a Native corporation is acting as a debtor-in-possession in a
chapter 11 proceeding, the corporation itself will not have the aban-
donment problem, but it may face objections from creditors regarding
whether funds of the estate in the hands of the debtor-in-possession
should be used to select or administer property from which the credi-
tors will receive no benefit. 18 The creditors will have support for their
objections in the Code1 9 and numerous judicial decisions under the
Code120 to the effect that all acts of a debtor-in-possession must be
directed toward the preservation and strengthening of the estate so
that the creditors may benefit.
A bankruptcy court dealing with a Native corporation's case will
have to decide whether the trustee (or the debtor-in-possession, acting
as trustee) should exercise the debtor's land selection rights, assuming
that the debtor has not selected or "prioritized" all of its allowed acre-
age at the time a bankruptcy estate is commenced. The court may also
have to determine whether the right to select land, or to select alter-
nate land if initial selections are not available, also passes to the estate
117. 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
118. This is similar to situations in which individual debtors seek to use funds of
the estate to pursue personal goals, such as obtaining exempt property or defeating
objections to discharge. Bankruptcy courts routinely reject application to pay attor-
neys' fees for these services from estate assets. See, e.g., In re Zweig, 35 Bankr. 37
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983).
119. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1106, 1107 (1982).
120. A debtor-in-possession has most of the powers and duties of a bankruptcy
trustee. Id. § 1107(a). A bankruptcy trustee is a fiduciary. Mosser v. Darrow, 341
U.S. 267 (1951); In re Combined Metals Reduction Co., 557 F.2d 179, 196 (9th Cir.
1977); Sherr v. Winkler, 552 F.2d 1367, 1374 (10th Cir. 1977).
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under section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code and whether the right to
select land under section 12 of ANCSA constitutes a legal or equitable
interest in property.
The right to "prioritize" a selection may be considered analogous
to an option to purchase one of a number of possible items or the right
to compel performance of a contract in one of several alternative ways,
both of which have been held to give the trustee rights to the affected
property.121 The concept of property is broad,122 and it is not essential
that property which the debtor may have a contractual right to ac-
quire be specifically identified, or even exist, when the bankruptcy pe-
tition is filed. It is well known that Native corporations are entitled to
substantial acreages of land, and it may be in reliance on these assets
that credit has been extended. 123 Thus, where there is land available
for selection that would be protected by the land bank, the trustee may
be allowed to exercise the debtor's rights to selected land. 124
3. Taxation and Tax Basis. ANCSA contains certain tax protec-
tions unique to lands conveyed to regional and village corporations.
Initial land conveyances to Native corporations are non-taxable, and
the income tax basis of a mine or block of timber shall not be less than
the fair value at the time of the first commercial development of the
property. 125 In addition, undeveloped and unleased lands, and lands
received in exchange therefor, are exempt from state and local real
property taxes. Any income from the lands, however, is not ex-
empt.126 Provisions were also enacted limiting or preventing taxation
121. See generally In re Bialac, 712 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1983), where the court said,
in holding that a bankruptcy estate was entitled to the benefit of the debtor's option to
redeem collateral: "[Tihe courts have consistently said that options or contingent in-
terests are property of the bankruptcy estate under section 541. 'The term "property"
has been construed most generously and an interest is not outside its reach because it
is novel or contingent or enjoyment must be postponed.'" Id. at 431 (citations
omitted).
122. Sierra Switchboard Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 789 F.2d 705 (9th Cir.
1986) (finding that an emotional distress claim was the property of a bankruptcy es-
tate under a broad construction of section 541).
123. This is not likely to be the case in the future under the current land bank
provisions found in the 1991 Amendments, as a creditor will be aware that reliance on
undeveloped land assets is unwarranted.
124. Approximately 35 million acres have been conveyed out of the 44 million to
be conveyed, of which about 7 million has been by patent, as of the writing of this
article. The Bureau of Land Management presently estimates it will take another 20
years to complete survey and patent of Native corporation land, if present funding
levels continue. Interview with Robert Arndorfer, Deputy State Director, Cadastral
Survey, Bureau of Land Management, Dep't of the Interior (Feb. 25, 1989).
125. 43 U.S.C. § 1620(c) (1982).
126. Id. § 1620(d). This exemption was made permanent under the 1991 Amend-
ments so long as the land is not leased or developed. Pub. L. No. 100-241, Feb. 3,
1988, 101 Stat. 1789.
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of individual Natives by reason of their receipt of regional or village
corporation stock. 127
A bankruptcy estate of a Native corporation presumably enjoys
the same tax exemptions as the Native corporation itself, though there
is no specific statutory language on this point. In general, a bank-
ruptcy estate inherits the debtor's federal income tax attributes such as
net operating loss carryforwards and tax basis. 128 It is reasonable to
conclude, by analogy, that a court would grant the same tax exemp-
tions to an estate holding the Native corporation's assets.
C. Obligations of Trustee with Respect to Lands
1. Section 7(i). ANCSA sets forth certain specific obligations to
which selected lands, or the regional and village corporations selecting
them, are subject. The best known and most intricate of these is found
in section 7(i) of ANCSA, which requires the original twelve regional
corporations to share with each other according to population seventy
percent of the revenue received by each regional corporation from its
timber resources and subsurface estate.129 Although it is one of the
shortest provisions in ANCSA, section 7(i) has spawned enormous
quantities of litigation as the resource-rich regional corporations argue
with the resource-poor corporations over the resolution of numerous
interpretation questions.130
127. Id. § 1620(b).
128. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1398, 1399 (1982).
129. Section 7(i) of ANCSA provides:
Seventy per centum of all revenues received by each Regional Corporation
from the timber resources and subsurface estate patented to it pursuant to
this [Act] shall be divided annually by the Regional Corporation among all
twelve Regional Corporations organized pursuant to this section according
to the number of Natives enrolled in each region pursuant to section 1604 of
this title. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to the thirteenth
Regional Corporation if organized pursuant to subsection (c) hereof.
43 U.S.C. § 1606(i) (1982).
130. Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Regional Corp., 484 F. Supp. 482 (D. Alaska
1980); Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Regional Corp., 417 F. Supp. 900 (D. Alaska
1976). Both of these cases involved the interpretation of section 7(i). Numerous inter-
pretation questions were litigated; all twelve of the Alaska-based regional corporations
were parties. The litigation's history was recently reviewed by the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Alaska in yet another decision interpreting section 7(i):
The dispute underlying each of the cases now before the court involves the
regional corporations' obligations under section 7(i) of ANCSA, 43 U.S.C.
§ 1606(i), to share with one another seventy percent (70%) of the revenues
they receive from timber and subsurface resources. In the oldest of the cases
at bar, No. 75-053, this court in 1976 determined that the revenue sharing
obligation extended to some species of "net" as opposed to "gross" revenues,
but stopped short of devising formulae by which net revenues could be cal-
culated. [Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Regional Corp., 421 F. Supp. 862,
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In 1982, the regional corporations entered into a "Section 7(i)
Settlement Agreement" which disposed of many problems and pro-
vided for arbitration to handle future disputes. 131 In general, regional
corporations must annually account for and distribute to each other,
in accordance with population, seventy percent of their net receipts,
after related expenses, from section 7(i) resources. Such resources are
defined in the Section 7(i) Settlement Agreement as: "The timber re-
sources (other than timber acquired by merger with a village corpora-
tion) and resources from the subsurface estate in ANCSA lands." 132
868-69 (1976)]. In 1980, after four more years of costly and divisive litiga-
tion, this court upon stipulation of the twelve regional corporations ap-
pointed a special master to assist the parties in resolving their disputes over
the calculation of net revenues. On June 29, 1982 all twelve of the regional
corporations executed an historic 121-page settlement agreement ("Agree-
ment"), finally resolving their disputes concerning their ANCSA § 7(i) obli-
gations. In 1983, after reviewing the special master's 37 page report
endorsing the Agreement, the court gave its approval and entered judgment
of dismissal.
Sealaska Corp. v. Aleut Corp., No. A88-515 (D. Alaska Jan. 25, 1989) (footnotes
omitted).
In this recent decision, the district court upheld the Section 7(i) Settlement
Agreement's arbitration provisions and refused to review or disturb an arbitration
award adverse to Sealaska Corporation, under which it was required to pay approxi-
mately $14 million in additional section 7(i) revenue to the other regional
corporations.
131. The Section 7(i) Settlement Agreement is not published in any publicly avail-
able source; it is, however, part of the record in Sealaska Corp. v. Aleut Corp., No.
A88-515 (D. daska Jan. 25, 1989) [hereinafter Settlement Agreement] (copy on file at
offices of Alaska Law Review).
132. Settlement Agreement, supra note 131, § 2(5). ANCSA Lands are defined as:
All lands or interests in lands withdrawn for selection or selected by a Cor-
poration pursuant to the provisions of ANCSA, or which may be obtainable
by a Corporation by agreement, exchange or otherwise by virtue of or in lieu
of the Corporation's land selection rights under ANCSA, or acquired in a
trade of lands or interests in lands in accordance with Article II, Section 6.
Lands shall not constitute ANCSA Lands after the occurrence of any of the
following:
(i) Acquisition of title (by fee or patented mining claim) to Section 7(i)
Resources in such lands by a Third Party other than the state or federal
government;
(ii) Relinquishment by a Corporation of an application under ANCSA
to select such lands or completion of administrative or judicial proceedings
finally resulting in rejection of such an application; or
(iii) Acquisition of title to such lands or interests therein by the Corpo-
ration by any means other than through the provisions of ANCSA. The fore-
going notwithstanding, ANCSA Lands shall include lands deemed to be
ANCSA Lands pursuant to Article III, Sections 2(a) and (I).
Id. § 2(4).
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Section 7(i) has proved a substantial benefit, especially to the corpora-
tions which lack resources or which have been slower to develop
them. 133
The trustee or debtor-in-possession takes a regional corporation's
land subject to the section 7(i) obligations, and it may be considered
that the share of net revenue to be distributed to other regional corpo-
rations is held by the bankruptcy estate in trust for those other re-
gional corporations. Thus, the beneficial interest in these funds would
be excluded from the estate under Bankruptcy Code section
541(b)(1).134 Additionally, the bankruptcy trustee would be subject to
the section 7(i) obligations of the debtor. Further, as the Section 7(i)
Settlement Agreement confirms, lands sold by the regional corpora-
tion to a non-ANCSA entity are freed of further section 7(i) obliga-
tions, but the sale proceeds are subject to distribution. 135 The same
rule is followed if the lands are mortgaged. The lender who forecloses
should have no obligation to comply with further section 7(i) obliga-
tions. Generally, a lender would "purchase" the property at the sale
133. The largest distributor of funds under section 7(i) has been Cook Inlet Re-
gion, Inc. ("CIRI"). CIRI's 1987 Annual Report discloses that prior to the distribu-
tion for fiscal year 1987, payable in March 1988, CIRI had distributed $67,982,838 to
other regional corporations. CIRI also had recorded a current liability of $5,504,724
to other regional and village corporations and at-large shareholders, though how
much of this was owed to other regional corporations under section 7(i) was not
shown.
CIRI's 1987 Annual Report also states that CIRI had received aggregate section
7(i) revenue of $4,348,194 from other regions. As CIRI's enrollment was 7.8% of the
total Native population for distribution purposes, and as secton 7(i) income is shared
between the regional corporations in accordance with population, arithmetic shows
that other regional corporations have distributed a total of $55,746,077 under section
7(i).
Of total section 7(i) revenue of $123,728,914 distributed through December 31,
1987, 50% is payable to village corporations and at-large shareholders by the recipient
regions under ANCSA section 7G). Precise figures are difficult to gather, but this
could equate to more than $300,000 per village corporation since 1972 (though the
amount received by a particular village corporation is also dependent on shareholder
enrollment). For many village corporations, this income represents their most de-
pendable source of cash flow.
134. 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
135. The Section 7(i) Settlement Agreement contemplates transfers to an unrelated
entity (defined as a "Third Party") under the Agreement.
When a corporation disposes of its Section 7(i) Resources pursuant to an
agreement with a Third Party that provides the Corporation an interest in
the profits from the Section 7(i) Resources conveyed .... Gross Section 7(i)
Revenues shall include only the net amount received by the Corporation pur-
suant to the agreement. .. ."
Settlement Agreement, supra note 131, at Art. II, § 1(h) (emphasis added). The
Agreement prohibits transfers to related entities unless such entities agree to be bound
by the Agreement. Id. at Art. II, § l(i).
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(at least in the absence of other bidders) by offset bid, and no cash
proceeds would be generated.13 6
A sale by a chapter 7 trustee to a non-ANCSA entity would re-
move the section 7(i) obligations from the property. If other ANCSA
entities, whether or not they are creditors of the debtor, believe that
they might benefit from further development or sale of mineral or tim-
ber property upon which a creditor of the debtor is seeking to fore-
close, they should be able to object to a motion for relief from stay
filed by that creditor. Still, it will be necessary for the debtor or the
objecting ANCSA entities to show that the interests of the foreclosing
creditor will be adequately protected as required by section 362(d) of
the Bankruptcy Code. 13 7
If a Native corporate debtor or its trustee proposes to sell mineral
or timber property to a non-ANCSA entity, any other regional or vil-
lage corporation could argue that it has an interest in the property by
virtue of section 7(i)'s requiring notice and an opportunity to be heard
before the property is to be sold under section 364 of the Code on the
basis that the property has a future income potential which is cut off
by the sale. The response to the argument, however, is that the pro-
ceeds of sale are subject to sharing under section 7(i) and neither Con-
gress nor the regional corporations in the Section 7(i) Settlement
Agreement imposed a greater burden, nor did Congress or the Settle-
ment Agreement intend to extend the obligations under section 7(i) to
a species of joint ownership of the real estate itself.
2. Sections 14(c) and 14(g). Section 14(c) of ANCSA imposes
obligations on each village corporation to convey from its lands (1) to
the individual occupants, the surface estate of their residences or busi-
ness premises; (2) to nonprofit corporations, the surface estate of land
occupied by them; (3) to municipal corporations, or to the state in
trust for them, the surface estate occupied by each Native village; and
136. Section 7(i) Settlement Agreement, Article II, Revenues Section l(d), pro-
vides, in part, that:
In the event of a Foreclosure of any loan secured by a Section 7(i) Resource
or an interest therein, to the extent the proceeds of such Foreclosure, net of
the costs thereof, do not exceed the underlying obligation (plus interest and
other financing costs) with respect to such borrowing, any Section 7(i) Re-
sources or their proceeds delivered in satisfaction of such borrowing... shall
not be included in Gross Section 7(i) Revenues ....
Id. supra note 131 at 19-20.
This is analogous to Northern Lights Inn Co. v. Employment Security Division,
Dep't of Labor, State of Alaska, 695 P.2d 723 (Alaska 1985), where the effect of a
statute attaching a tax lien to "proceeds" was abrogated when the sale at foreclosure
did not result in "cash" and "there is no fund available from which ... to withhold
the amount of the tax debt .... " 695 P.2d at 725.
137. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1982).
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(4) to the federal government, the state, or the appropriate municipal
corporation, the surface estate necessary for airport facilities. 138 These
obligations are binding on a bankruptcy estate, and the trustee must
convey the land as specified by section 14(c). The trustee must also
recognize all "valid existing rights" to which conveyances of land to
regional and village corporations are subject, as required under
ANCSA section 14(g). 139
The burden these subsections place on a village corporation can
be enormous. If the extent of the private rights could have been de-
fined and determined immediately upon the passage of ANCSA, some
of this burden could have been lessened or eliminated. Now, however,
the determination of the extent of section 14(c) selections and section
14(g) rights can be extremely complex, requiring the services of a
trained title examiner, surveyor, and/or land status engineer. If the
lands subject to determinations are part of a bankruptcy estate, the
administrative cost and expense incurred by the trustee in bankruptcy
could be formidable and might not be justified given the possible bene-
fits flowing to the creditors of the estate. No conveyances could be
made, however, even in satisfaction of debts, without the settlement of
the land status and resolution of rights under subsections 14(c) and
14(g). No village corporation chapter 7 bankruptcy could be settled
without this expensive, and considerable, delay in determining the sta-
tus of the property of the estate.
D. Income of Regional and Village Corporations
1. Ordinary Income. Most regional corporations and some of the
village corporations conduct substantial business activities, and some
of the regional corporations have become extremely diversified. Their
revenues from general business activity are not subject to any particu-
lar restrictions under ANCSA or any of the later amendments to
ANCSA. Accordingly, there is no reason to attempt to exclude any
general revenues from a bankruptcy estate.
2. Income Under Sections 7(i) and 70). The ordinary business
corporation generates regular income from the sale of its products or
138. 43 U.S.C. § 1613(c) (1982).
139. Section 1613(g) of ANCSA provides, in part:
All conveyances made pursuant to this [Act] shall be subject to valid existing
rights. Where, prior to patent of any land or minerals under this [Act,] a
lease, contract, permit, right-of-way, or easement... has been issued for the
surface or minerals covered under such patent, the patent shall contain pro-
visions making it subject to the lease, contract, permit, right-of-way, or ease-
ment ....
Id. § 1613(g). See Seldovia Native Ass'n v. Hodel, No. A-81-008 (D. Alaska Feb. 3,
1989).
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services and from the disposition of its assets. It may also receive in-
come in the form of damages or awards from breach of contract or
loss of its property. Never does an ordinary business corporation re-
ceive income simply because the corporation exists. But Native corpo-
rations are not ordinary business corporations. Both regional and
village corporations do receive substantial income under sections 7(i)
and 70) of ANCSA simply because they exist. 140
Section 70) requires each regional corporation to distribute to the
village corporations in its region, and to its at-large shareholders
(shareholders who do not live in a village and who hold no village
corporation stock), half of all funds received from other regional cor-
porations under section 7(i). 141 Many village corporations conduct lit-
tle business and have few income-producing assets; others operate at a
loss and have done so for years. These companies depend on their
section 70) receipts as regular cash flow, and, if this cash flow were to
cease, it is likely that a substantial number of village corporations
would simply stop functioning as economic entitites. Accounting for
and distributing the section 7(j) funds also requires each regional cor-
poration to maintain current shareholder lists, both of itself and of the
village corporations in its region. This is a constant effort, as the
shareholder rosters are constantly changing through death, relocation,
and inheritance among the Alaska Native population, which num-
bered approximately 80,000 people as of 1986.142
Inquiries regarding shareholder status and payments must be
dealt with. Also, undeveloped land, which under the 1991 Amend-
ments is immune from creditor action and probably excluded from a
bankruptcy estate, must be managed. This requires the regional cor-
poration to maintain a paid staff, which is purely an overhead expense.
For profitable corporations, the accounting and record keeping re-
quired may be just an inconvenience; for those which are not profita-
ble, the burden can be severe. If, under the demands of the
Bankruptcy Code, the debtor must surrender all of its developed or
140. See supra note 129; 43 U.S.C. §§ 1606(i), (j) (1982). Section 70) provides, in
part:
Not less than 45% of funds from such sources [including funds received
under subsection (i)] during the first five-year period [following enactment of
ANCSA], and 50% thereafter, shall be distributed [by the regional corpora-
tions] among the Village Corporations in the region and the class of stock-
holders who are not residents of those villages ....
43 U.S.C. § 1606(j) (1982).
141. Id.
142. As of December 31, 1985, the Alaska Native Roll, prepared pursuant to sec-
tion 5 of ANCSA, numbered 80,239 eligible Natives. R. Reyes, Enrollment Coordina-
tor, United States Dep't of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Tribal Government
Section, Juneau, Alaska 99801. The enrollment has not been updated since December
31, 1985.
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monetary assets for creditor payments, this burden, imposed or im-
plied by statute, may be impossible for a regional corporation which is
forced to seek bankruptcy protection.
Village corporations face parallel issues. As noted above, village
corporations are charged with untangling section 14(c) and section
14(g) rights, and they typically perform a variety of social welfare
functions for their communities. Like regional corporations, the vil-
lage corporations must maintain their undeveloped lands. 143 These
activities are either unique to, or uncommonly expensive for, the Na-
tive corporations. For the village corporations, the section 70) reve-
nue may be essential in order to continue their existence.
Any Native corporation faced with or contemplating bankruptcy
relief must consider the status of its section 7(i) or section 70) income,
which may be the only source of cash available to cover its day-to-day
expenses as well as the extraordinary administrative costs imposed by
bankruptcy proceedings. But the creditors also will have their eyes on
the section 7(i) or section 70) income of the debtor as possibly their
only source of payment in the future; this income stream can be de-
pended upon, in some amount, regardless of the debtor's independent
business efforts.
Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code makes all section 7(i) or 70)
cash, on hand or received during the bankruptcy case, property of the
estate. 144 Section 541(b)(1) excludes property of which the debtor is
solely the trustee "for the benefit of an entity other than the debtor."
In an unreported decision, an Alaska trial court held that, upon re-
ceipt of funds pursuant to section 7(i), a regional corporation becomes
the trustee of a resulting trust 145 of that portion of such monies which
are received by the regional corporation for the beneficial use of the
village corporations. 46
143. ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.138 (1985) (meeting of shareholders); id. § 10.05.144
(stock transfer books); id § 10.05.147 (voting lists); 43 U.S.C. § 1607(c) (1982) (au-
dit); id. § 16020) (land management); id. § 1606 (applicable to villages).
144. See supra note 69. Everything not excluded from the estate by section 541 is
available for creditors' claims unless exempt under section 522. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1982
& Supp. IV 1986).
145. A "resulting trust" is one in which a party becomes invested with legal title to
property, but holds that title for the benefit of another, although without expressed
intent to do so, because of a presumption of such intent arising by operation of law.
First Nat'l Bank of Denver v. Harry W. Rabb Foundation, 479 P.2d 986 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1970).
146. Bering Straits Native Corp. v. Alaska Nat'l Bank of the North, No. 3AN-80-
6815 Civ. (Anchorage Super. Ct., Feb. 27, 1984) (order granting and denying motion
and cross-motions for summary judgment). Judge Rowland did not in his order ex-
pand upon his finding, but he did find the briefs of Sitnasuak Native Corporation
persuasive. Those briefs refer to the following authorities:
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Is it, therefore, proper to award to the trustee in a chapter 7 case
the right to the "non-trust" portion of all future section 7(i) or 7(j)
income to pay creditors until their claims are paid in full? Is it proper
to require a chapter 11 plan, in order to satisfy the "best interests of
creditors" test in section 1129(a)(7) of the Code to calculate and dis-
tribute the present liquidation value of the debtor's indefinite future
section 7(i) or 7(j) income? ANCSA does not address these questions
at all. Because section 7(i) and section 7(j) income is without parallel
in commercial law, the Bankruptcy Code provides no hints as to
whether section 7(i) and section 70) income is treated differently from
other kinds of income.
The language of the Claims Act is clear in that regional corporations do not
take funds, revenues, or other income which the law mandates be shared or
redistributed as beneficial owners or even under a claim of right, but instead
are mere conduits, the instruments chosen by Congress to receive and pass
along funds which the Federal Government would have practical difficulties
in itself disbursing.
Lazarus & West, The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: A Flawed Victory, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1976, at 132, 143.
Subsections (j) and (k) of the Settlement Act create purely administra-
tive duties on the part of regional corporations allowing them no discretion
in their performance. In these instances, the regional corporations have no
authority to make decisions either favorable or adverse to the interests of
village corporations.
Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc. v. Chignik Fisheries, Inc., No. A80-195 Civ. (D. Alaska
1982), at 70-71.
When Alaska Native fund money is received by the regional corpora-
tions, 55% [sic] (50% after the first five years) of the amount does not be-
long to the regional corporations but must be distributed to stockholders,
village corporations and non-village residents. This distributable portion
may not be used as working capital of the corporation.
TOUCHE Ross AND Co., ANCSA: A TECHNICAL ANALYSIS 70-71 (1974) (emphasis
added).
In his later June 5, 1987, Memorandum of Decision in Bering Straits, Judge Row-
land expanded upon the implications of his finding that sections 7(i) and 7(j) create a
resulting trust:
[The village corporation] had a beneficial interest in the monies which would
form the trust res, and that.., beneficial interest had been created by the
United States Government and not [the regional corporation. The regional
corporation], although it had legal title to the monies, had no power, by
virtue of ANCSA or otherwise, to destroy such beneficial interest or right to
convert the villages' portion to their own use. [Memorandum of Decision, at
3.]
[ilTe regional corporation] had a fiduciary responsibility to ultimately turn
over the village portion of the monies held in the trust account to the villages
.... [Memorandum of Decision, at 10.]
iiTe regional corporation], in receiving monies legislatively destined for the
villages under the conditions established by ANCSA, was a resulting
trustee.... [The regional corporation] could not spend the village monies as
if the monies belonged to it. [Memorandum of Decision, at 20.]
1989] BANKRUPTCY OF NATIVE CORPORATIONS 115
Creditors in a bankruptcy may be expected to insist that they
should be entitled to this income stream or its present value. There
are administrative difficulties in calculating the future benefits, and in-
quiry of the profitable regional corporations which are the sources of
future section 7(i) income may be of little benefit, given their reluc-
tance to disclose the needed information for competitive reasons. Still,
if an estimate must be made, it can be done, however roughly, using
historical data, known mineral and timber resources, and a considera-
ble amount of educated guesswork. If this process develops anything
other than a minimal present value for the calculations, the creditors
may oppose confirmation of a plan of reorganization which calls for
abandoning future section 7(i) or section 70) income.
Because section 7(i) or 7() income simply "arrives," as opposed
to being earned through sale of services or property, it does not fit the
traditional asset categories with which bankruptcy cases usually deal.
Because it is statutorily created rather than arising through traditional
market methods, and because the statute which created it was drafted
to provide compensation and benefits to Alaska Natives, it may be
argued that the section 7(i) and 70) income is excluded from the bank-
ruptcy estate completely; this is the case with the post-petition income
of a chapter 7 or 11 individual debtor earned through personal
services. 147
ANILCA and the 1991 Amendments afforded the opportunity to
exempt regional and village corporation lands from creditor action
through the land bank. The lack of any further express exemption148
suggests that a court may be reluctant to infer one.
Judge Rowland found that the following conduct, among others, amounted to a
breach of the regional corporation's fiduciary duty:
1. The trustee failed to segregate the funds destined for the villages and failed to
account separately for the village interests.
2. The regional corporation granted assignments of its section 7(i) receipts to
secure various indebtedness without the consent of the village corporations.
3. The regional corporation did not provide an accounting or disclose any infor-
mation regarding its use of the monies which ultimately should have gone to the vil-
lage corporations.
4. The regional corporation used the village share of section 7(i) monies in in-
vestments of less than trust quality.
5. The regional corporation failed to make the trust assets productive and failed
to dispose of bad investments.
[Memorandum of Decision, at 18-19.]
147. Section 541(a)(6) includes in the bankruptcy estate: "Proceeds, product, off-
spring, rents, or profits of or from property of the estate, except such as are earnings
from services performed by an individual debtor after the commencement of the case."
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (Supp. IV 1986).
148. Section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code sets out certain property which individ-
ual debtors are permitted to exempt from the estate. This is designed to permit a
"fresh start" and prevent total destitution of individual debtors. Section 522 provides
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However, one of the reasons artificial entities lack exemptions in
bankruptcy is that they are assumed to have no reason to exist once
they will no longer be profitable. As voluntary associations for profit,
corporations and partnerships are simply abandoned once they cease
to further their owners' goals (though they may continue to linger
while management theoretically pursues resuscitation efforts). Having
no further social reason to exist, there is no economic reason to retain
assets for their benefit.
This assumption does not apply to Native corporations. Even af-
ter a chapter 7 liquidation, the Native corporations will continue to
exist, maintain shareholder rolls, be audited, and hold shareholder
meetings. Village corporations will continue to be subject to section
14(c) and 14(g) responsibilities. In addition, the regional corporations
must calculate, receive, and distribute their respective shares of section
7(i) and 7(j) income; they must also monitor and, where necessary,
challenge the section 7(i) payments by other regional corporations.
These functions cannot be performed by an "empty shell" which has
been deprived of all income and assets by a trustee in bankruptcy liqui-
dating assets in a chapter 7 case, or by a debtor operating under a
chapter 11 plan which requires all available cash flow to be paid to
creditors.
Because section 7(i) or section 7(j) income is property of the es-
tate, a chapter 7 trustee can claim it all, at least as long as the estate is
open. The costs of computing and maintaining the shareholder regis-
ter, calculating section 7(i) and 70) income due and distributable to
village corporations and at-large shareholders, and monitoring other
Native corporation payments can be paid out of the debtor's section
7(i) or 70) income as administrative expenses. The trustee may not be
able to sell or assign the debtor's future section 7(i) or 70) income for a
lump sum discount to cash out the creditors, but the estate can remain
open as long as section 7(i) and 7(j) income is available or until credi-
tors have been paid.
A chapter 11 plan, which must pay dissenting creditors at least as
much as they would receive in a liquidation under chapter 7,149 can
provide that all section 7(i) or 70) income, above that necessary to
perform required accounting and shareholder registry functions, be
paid to creditors, as they would receive that income in a chapter 7
case. Neither of these uses of section 7(i) or 70) income is of any
these exemptions "[n]otwithstanding section 541 of this title" (which establishes the
estate). There is no provision in section 522 for non-individual exemptions from the
coverage of section 541, so any exclusion from the estate must be found within section
541 itself or must be found outside the confines of the Bankruptcy Code. II U.S.C.
§ 522 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
149. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (Supp. IV 1986).
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direct benefit to shareholders, except to the extent that the regional or
village corporation may eventually recover financial strength as its
debts are paid. For this reason, it can be more forcefully argued that
including section 7(i) or 7() income in the definition of property of the
estate does not further the special policies behind ANCSA. Such poli-
cies would favor exempting ANCSA corporations from the rules gen-
erally applicable in bankruptcy proceedings. Congress did not,
however, accompany the special policies with any special exemptions
for section 7(i) or 7(j) income. At present, the concept that post-con-
firmation section 7(i) and 7(j) income is excluded from a bankruptcy
estate has not been addressed by any court.
The court does have discretion at various points in the chapter 11
process to consider the special purposes and historical genesis of
ANCSA. This can occur under section 1112(b)150 in determining
whether a case should be converted to chapter 7. It can also arise
under section 1129(a) in deciding the liquidation value of a chapter 11
debtor 51 and under section 1129(c) in deciding what plan to confirm
when more than one plan meets the confirmation tests.152 In the final
analysis, absent further clarifying legislation, the status of these pay-
ments will remain in doubt.
3. Net Operating Losses. For approximately eighteen months be-
tween October 1986153 and April 1988154 Native corporations were the
beneficiaries of highly favorable tax legislation which enabled them to
150. Section 1112(b) provides, in part:
[O]n request of a party in interest or the United States trustee, and after
notice and a hearing, the court may convert a case under this chapter to a
case under Chapter 7 of this title or may dismiss a case under this chapter,
whichever is in the best interest of creditors and the estate, for cause ....
Id. § 1112(b).
151. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
152. Section 1129(c) provides, in part: "If the requirements of subsections (a) and
(b) of this section are met with respect to more than one plan, the court shall consider
the preferences of creditors and equity security holders in determining which plan to
confirm." Id. § 1129(c).
153. The Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, was enacted
into law October 22, 1986. The Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat.
494, had also contained liberalized standards for ANCSA corporations to enter into
net operating loss ("NOL") transactions. A few corporations entered into NOL trans-
actions under the 1984 Act (including Bering Straits, under the aegis of the bank-
ruptcy court). But questions remained under the 1984 Act as to whether NOL
transactions with thin or nonexistent business purpose could withstand audit; it was
not until the 1986 Act swept away any reservations as to this issue that NOLs were
freely bought and sold.
154. Section 5021 of the Technical Corrections and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342, provides for a phaseout of NOL transac-
tions. The general rule, codified in subsection (a), was that such transactions cannot
be entered into after April 26, 1988. Subsection (b) extended that deadline for certain
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
"sell" their net operating losses and similar tax attributes ("NOLs") 155
to third parties who had no other economic relationship to the Native
corporations except to "buy" the NOLs. The NOL transactions en-
tered into by all the Native corporations during this brief span of time
aggregated hundreds of millions of dollars. Since chapter 11 debtors,
almost by definition, have accumulated large operating losses, several
of these NOL transactions were entered into by chapter 11 debtors
with the blessing of the bankruptcy court and to the delight of the
corporations' creditors and shareholders.
These NOL transactions raised a number of thorny and unprece-
dented legal issues which by now have been either mooted by full pay-
ment of creditors' claims or have been fully adjudicated. Inasmuch as
it is improbable in the extreme that Congress will once again favor
Native corporations with the ability to sell NOLs, some of the NOL-
related issues are now only of historical interest. However, because
the NOL proceeds1 56 from the NOL sales remain escrowed pending
audit by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") or a closing of the par-
ties' tax books, NOL transactions remain an extremely important facet
of Native corporations' financial health. Ironically, a working knowl-
edge of NOLs is as important to Native corporation leaders today as
the feeding habits and migration patterns of creatures of the land and
sea were to tribal elders generations ago.
NOLs can be utilized (that is, used to reduce federal income taxes
on what would be taxable income in the absence of the NOL) in two
basic ways. One is for the taxpayer, itself, to generate a profit which
would otherwise give rise to a tax liability and to offset that profit
against the taxpayer's own NOL.15 7 This is the "normal" way to util-
ize the NOL. The other way is to "sell" the NOL; that is, to enter into
a transaction under which a second taxpayer's income is utilized to
offset the first taxpayer's NOL.' 58
In the second situation, the "loss" corporation does not simply
exchange the NOL for an agreed upon purchase price. Instead, the
loss corporation and the profit corporation enter into a complicated
NOL transactions in process, and subparagraph (3) of subsection (6) extended the
deadline further for ANCSA corporations then in chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings.
155. In this article, NOLs encompass net operating loss carryovers, tax credit car-
ryovers, capital loss carryovers, and similar tax attributes.
156. NOL proceeds typically consist of a combination of cash paid to the ANCSA
corporation at closing, together with cash paid into escrow to be released from escrow
upon a favorable audit, the closing of the parties' tax books, or other conditions.
157. 26 U.S.C. § 172(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
158. This can be accomplished by consolidating the "loss" corporation with the
"gain" corporation for tax purposes, resulting in the filing of a consolidated income
tax return under section 1501 of the Internal Revenue Code.
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transaction which meets applicable Internal Revenue Code require-
ments, 15 9 which permits the income from the profitable corporation to
be offset by the loss corporation's NOLs. The profitable corporation
then pays the loss corporation an agreed-upon percentage of the
amount saved by the resulting tax deduction.
The 1986 Tax Reform Act contained statutory provisions as well
as a legislative history favorable to ANCSA corporations'60 which
confirmed that such corporations were permitted to enter into tax
sharing arrangements without regard to business purpose require-
ments, assignment of income doctrine, or any other judicial or statu-
tory impediment.1 61
159. A typical format of a Native corporation NOL transaction is as follows:
1. A profitable corporation ("Taxpayer") and the Native corporation create a
jointly owned subsidiary ("Newco"), at least 80% of whose voting stock is owned by
the Native corporation. The Taxpayer owns the equity through preferred stock,
which can be converted into controlling common stock if, for any reason, the Native
corporation decides to use its voting power to take action deemed inimical to the
interests of the Taxpayer.
2. A tax sharing agreement is entered into in which the Native corporation and
the Taxpayer agree on the division between them of the cash to be saved by the NOLs
of the Native corporation due to the filing of a consolidated tax return.
3. The Taxpayer assigns income to Newco for the period of time in which the
Native corporation controls its voting stock.
4. The Native corporation and Newco file a consolidated federal income tax
return, in which the Newco income is offset by the Native corporation's losses.
5. The agreed payment is made to the Native corporation with one exception.
If there is doubt about the ability of the Native corporation's losses to withstand audit
or IRS examination, however, a portion of the payments may be placed in escrow or
trust until the IRS has accepted the tax returns, the statute of limitations for challenge
to the return has expired, or any challenge has been judicially resolved.
The opportunity for Native corporations to engage in further NOL transactions
of this type was severely curtailed in the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342 ("the 1988 Act"). Section 5021 of the 1988
Act repealed section 60(b)(5) of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Certain transitional
rules were included to allow some transfers of NOLs under existing agreements and to
allow some transactions by Native corporations under the jurisdiction of a district
court under title I 1 of the United States Code (the Bankruptcy Code) on April 26,
1988. See supra note 154. Utilizing this transitional provision, Bering Straits Native
Corporation was able to secure bankruptcy court approval of an NOL transaction on
January 4, 1989, in conjunction with confirmation of a modified plan of reorganiza-
tion. See Order Approving Agreement by and Between Bering Straits Native Corpo-
ration and J.C. Penney Co., In re Bering Straits Native Corp., No. 2-86-00002 (Bankr.
D. Alaska Jan. 4, 1989).
160. Alaska Senator Ted Stevens stated that the purpose of the clarifying amend-
ment was to increase the Native share of the net tax benefits, thus furthering the policy
decision made by Congress in 1984. 132 CONG. REc. S8,176 (daily ed. June 23, 1986).
161. Internal Revenue Code Section 1504(b)(5)(B), as it existed in the 1986 Tax
Reform Act, provided:
Except as provided in subparagraph (C), during the period described in sub-
paragraph (A), no provision of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (including
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
When chapter 11 Native corporation debtors entered into a post-
petition NOL transaction 162 the threshold question was whether the
NOL proceeds were property of the bankruptcy estate. The NOL it-
self, as it existed on the petition date or at the time of the NOL trans-
action, did not fit neatly into the bankruptcy definition of property of
the estate contained in section 541. But the NOL, like other tax attrib-
utes of the pre-petition debtor, did carry over to the debtor-in-posses-
sion.163 Once the NOL transaction was entered into, the NOL
proceeds received by the debtor did fit squarely within section
541(a)(7), which includes as property of the estate "[a]ny interest in
property that the estate acquires after the commencement of the
case."164
A more difficult and interesting question was presented as the se-
cured creditors scrambled to review their security documents in order
to determine if the NOL as of the petition date and, hence, the NOL
proceeds from the post-petition NOL transaction were subject to their
security interest.165 In the Tigara Corporation bankruptcy, Judge
sections 269 and 482) orprinciple of law shall apply to deny the benefit or use
of losses incurred or credits earned by a corporation described in subparagraph
(A) [Alaska Native Corporation] to the affiliated group of which the Native
Corporation is the common parent.
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1804(e)(5), 100 Stat. 2801 (emphasis
added).
162. Bering Straits Native Corporation, Tigara Corporation, and Haida Corpora-
tion all entered into one or more NOL transactions with bankruptcy court approval
after the filing of their cases. Bering Straits did not have any creditors with secured
claims to "accounts" or "general intangibles" and, so, escaped litigation on whether
its NOL proceeds were subject to secured creditors' claims. Haida and Tigara were
both subject to such claims. Haida's litigation was mooted by the sale of property and
payment of claims with the proceeds after confirmation of a plan of reorganization. In
Tigara's case, the bankruptcy court denied the claim of the secured claimant to the
NOL proceeds. In re Bering Straits Native Corp., No. 2-86-00002, Orders of May 28,
1986, and Jan. 4, 1989 (Bankr. D. Alaska); In re Tigara Corp., No. 3-86-00707, Or-
ders of Dec. 5, 1986, and July 17, 1987 (Bankr. D. Alaska); In re Haida Corp., No.
5X-85-00005, Orders of Oct. 29, 1986, and Dec. 24, 1986 (Bankr. D. Alaska).
163. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1398, 1399 (1982).
164. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(7) (Supp. IV 1986).
165. Bankruptcy limits a pre-petition secured creditor's rights to property acquired
post-petition. Section 552 provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, property acquired by
the estate or by the debtor after the commencement of the case is not subject
to any lien resulting from any security agreement entered into by the debtor
before the commencement of the case.
(b) Except as provided in sections 363, 506(c), 544, 545, 547, and 548 of this
title, if the debtor and an entity entered into a security agreement before the
commencement of the case and if the security interest created by such secur-
ity agreement extends to property of the debtor acquired before the com-
mencement of the case and to proceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits
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Ross held in an unreported decision166 that a bank with a security
interest in everything except general intangibles did not have a secur-
ity interest in the NOL and, therefore, not in the NOL proceeds. In
dicta, he suggested that the NOL was not "property" within the mean-
ing of the Uniform Commercial Code and that NOLs were not general
intangibles or any other types of collateral.167
Now that NOLs are a thing of the past, the question of what pre-
petition security documents are necessary to obtain a security interest
in NOL proceeds from a pre-petition NOL transaction will never
again arise, as all NOL transactions will be pre-petition with respect to
future Native corporation bankruptcies. In order to be secured on the
NOL proceeds due from a pre-petition transaction, a creditor need
only obtain a secruity interest in general intangibles or other readily
recognizable category of collateral, depending on the exact structure
of the transaction.
III. RESOLUTION OF THE BANKRUPTCY CASE
A. Liquidation Under Chapter 7
It is assumed that all voluntary bankruptcy cases by Native cor-
porations will be filed under chapter 11, with the view to reorganiza-
tion and continuation of the business. It is not to be expected that a
Native corporation will voluntarily put itself into a liquidation pro-
ceeding under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Even if the creditors
of a Native corporation succeed in an order for relief after filing an
involuntary petition under chapter 7,168 it is likely that the debtor will
exercise its one-time option to convert the chapter 7 case to a case
under chapter 11.169 Whether it has arrived in bankruptcy court vol-
untarily or involuntarily, the Native corporate debtor will operate in
chapter 11 debtor-in-possession status for some time while its manage-
ment and its creditors attempt to assess the debtor's financial status
of such property, then such security interest extends to such proceeds, prod-
uct, offspring, rents, or profits acquired by the estate after the commence-
ment of the case to the extent provided by such security agreement and by
applicable nonbankruptcy law, except to any extent that the court, after no-
tice and a hearing and based on the equities of the case, orders otherwise.
11 U.S.C. § 552 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
166. Memorandum Decision for Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment, In Re Tigara Corp. (Bankr. D. Alaska Nov. 21, 1988).
167. Id. at 13. In the Haida Corporation bankruptcy, a creditor claimed a broad-
form security interest in all categories of property recognized by Article 9 of the Uni-
form Commerical Code, including general intangibles. The dispute became moot
when Haida Corporation paid all its creditors in full, with interest.
168. 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
169. Id. § 706(a).
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and prospects for becoming profitable and making at least some pay-
ments to creditors. The Bankruptcy Code does not set any limit on
the time the debtor may remain "in chapter 11," though the court may
establish such a limit in a particular case.170 Eventually, however, un-
less the case is dismissed, in which case bankruptcy law and proce-
dures no longer apply to the debtor, the case must reach one of two
results. Either there will be confirmation of a plan of reorganization
under section 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code which may provide either
for the liquidation or continuation of the debtor in some form,' 71 or
there will be conversion, or reconversion, of the case to a chapter 7
liquidation proceeding. 172
Section 1112(b) of the Bankruptcy Code lists a number of non-
exclusive causes for conversion of a chapter 11 case to a chapter 7
liquidation. 73 Among the most frequently encountered causes of con-
version is continuing loss to the estate and absence of any reasonable
prospect of reorganization. If the Native corporation cannot improve
its pre-bankruptcy performance and begin to operate without further
losses after filing for relief, its creditors are likely to press for a chapter
7 proceeding just to force the debtor's business to terminate and
thereby reduce ongoing losses. The bankruptcy court may give the
debtor's management some time in which to reduce costs and look for
additional sources of income, but if the losses cannot be arrested, the
court is likely to order conversion to avoid shrinkage of assets which
might otherwise be available for creditors. Conversion to chapter 7 is
also likely, even without ongoing losses, if no plan of reorganization
has been confirmed after a reasonable time or if the court does not
believe that a plan can be confirmed in the case.' 74
In a chapter 7 proceeding, a trustee is appointed whose primary
function is to turn the property of the estate into money for distribu-
tion to creditors to the extent of their claims. The trustee will have to
determine the assets available to the estate. 75 The trustee will be able
to administer the leased and developed land and the personal property
and income rights otherwise available to the debtor at the time of filing
the case and thereafter arising.' 76 Additionally, as elaborated upon
above, the trustee may have access to the undeveloped land as well, for
payment of claims incurred prior to the enactment of the 1991
170. Id. § 1112(b)(4).
171. Id. §§ 1123(a)(5), 1129(a)(11).
172. Id. § 1112(b).
173. Id.
174. Id. § 1129(b)(5).
175. See supra text accompanying notes 69-75.
176. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See supra notes 140-52 and accom-
panying text for the reasons the court may or may not find the section 7(i) or 70)
income excluded from the bankruptcy estate.
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Amendments, depending on the extent to which the protections of sec-
tion 11 of the Amendments are deemed to apply.1 77 The trustee may,
but need not, operate the debtor's business and is likely to do so, if
feasible, only for a short time in which the possibility of selling the
business as a going concern can be explored.178 After the issues in-
volved in identifying property of the estate have been resolved or set-
tled, the trustee will liquidate and distribute the estate, a process
which might endure for years if assets prove difficult to sell or
administer.
The debtor will not cease its corporate existence in chapter 7, but
it will cease to have any assets, other than the undeveloped land pro-
tected by the land bank. In addition, the debtor will be without in-
come with which to operate except to the extent that the court finds,
for the reasons outlined above, that the section 7(i) or 70) income is
excluded from the bankruptcy estate. If this income is not part of the
estate, the debtor will be a mere shell and may cease to exist in fact if it
is involuntarily dissolved under Alaska law. If the debtor is without
employees to file the necessary reports and lacks funds to pay the bi-
annual franchise taxes, involuntary dissolution may well result.17 9
If, in an effort to keep itself alive, the Native corporation in chap-
ter 7 leases or develops its undeveloped land excluded from the bank-
ruptcy estate under the 1991 Amendments, it may find that it has done
so for naught. Once this land is leased or developed, it may no longer
be excluded from the estate, and the trustee may demand turnover of
that property to the estate so that it can be administered for the benefit
of the creditors.180
177. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1636(d)(1)(B) (1986 & West Supp. 1988).
178. The court may authorize the trustee to operate the business of the debtor for a
limited period, if such operation is in the best interest of the estate and consistent with
the orderly liquidation of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 721 (1982).
179. The Alaska Statutes provide for involuntary dissolution of a corporation by
the state when, among other things:
(1) the corporation is delinquent six months in filing its biennial report or in
paying a license filing fee or penalty;
(2) the corporation has failed for 30 days to appoint and maintain a regis-
tered agent in this state;(3) the corporation has failed for 30 days after change of its registered office
or registered agent to file in the office of the commissioner a statement of the
change;
(5) a vacancy on the board [of directors] of the corporation is not filled
within six months or the next annual meeting, whichever occurs first;
i7)" the corporation is 90 days delinquent in filing notice of change of an
officer, director, alien affiliate, or five percent shareholder as required by this
[statute]; ....
ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.633 (1988).
180. 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (1982).
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Even if the chapter 7 proceeding is terminated because the trustee
can find no further assets to administer, the miseries of the debtor will
not be ended. In a chapter 7 case, a corporate debtor does not receive
a discharge, and unpaid creditors can continue to sue and execute
upon the debtor's property, other than perhaps its undeveloped land,
until they are paid in full.' 8 '
B. Confirmation of a Chapter 11 Plan
1. Confirmation, Generally. For the reasons outlined above, most
Native corporations forced to seek bankruptcy relief will file under
chapter 11. Even if adequate cause exists for conversion to a chapter 7
proceeding, creditors may refrain from asking for such conversion,
given the legal uncertainties of chapter 7 liquidation as applied to Na-
tive corporations, the practical problems of liquidating a geographi-
cally distant enterprise with illiquid assets, and the necessity for
compromise. Therefore, Native corporations in bankruptcy must
eventually propose a reorganization plan or face a plan proposed by
one or more creditors. Confirmation of a non-liquidating plan results
in a discharge under section 1141 of the Bankruptcy Code' 82 and pro-
vides the Native corporate debtor with the one chance to emerge from
bankruptcy protection and be assured of an economic future.
A confirmed plan of reorganization under chapter 11 is a court-
approved contract between the debtor, its creditors, and its equity se-
curity holders (for example, shareholders). A plan organizes and clas-
sifies the claims against, and equity interests in, the debtor. The
reorganization plan specifies the means by and extent to which the
claims of creditors will be satisfied in the future and may, in addition,
provide for the creation of new classes of stockholders and reduce or
eliminate altogether the rights of existing shareholders. The plan may
provide for a sale or liquidation of part or all of the debtor's business
or the transfer of the business to a new entity which will take on the
responsibility for payment of claims.183 While the Bankruptcy Code
specifies some provisions which a corporate plan of reorganization
must include, 184 there are few prohibited terms, and the debtor and its
creditors are encouraged to create and agree upon terms which fit the
needs of the business being reorganized.
To be confirmed by the bankruptcy court, a chapter 11 plan must
satisfy the tests of section 1129(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. 85 One
test is contained in section 1129(a)(7), the so-called "best interests of
181. Id. § 727(a)(i).
182. 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
183. Id. § 1123(b).
184. Id. § 1123(a).
185. Id. § 1129(a).
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creditors" test, which provides that any creditor which does not ac-
cept the plan must receive under the plan as much as that creditor
would receive in a chapter 7 liquidation.1 86 A second prerequisite for
confirmation of a reorganization plan is found in section 1129(a)(8). 187
This section requires that each voting class of creditors accept the plan
by one-half in number of, and two-thirds in dollar amount of claims
held by, creditors voting on the plan in the class. Both of these tests
present unique issues to an ANCSA corporation seeking confirmation
of a plan.
2. "Best Interests of Creditors" Test. Unanimous acceptance of a
plan cannot be anticipated, so the debtor must be prepared to demon-
strate that a dissenting creditor is being treated as well as it would be
under a chapter 7 liquidation. The debtor will want to guarantee its
own future survival; therefore, it cannot commit to the plan all of its
revenues into the future, and it may not wish to dedicate any of its
section 7(i) or 70) income to the plan. Neither will the debtor wish to
dedicate any of its undeveloped and unleased land to the plan, as to do
so will abandon the automatic land bank protection afforded by the
1991 Amendments. Yet, if all of these assets are excluded from future
payments, there may be little left to offer creditors to induce accept-
ance of the plan. Nor can the debtor demonstrate that the plan is an
improvement over a liquidation under which future section 7(i) and
70) income might well be available to creditors and the risk of further
business losses would be averted.
Despite the debtor's ability to exclude undeveloped, unleased land
and, possibly, future section 7(i) and 70) income from a liquidation
analysis, the debtor may have the unpleasant prospect of offering reve-
nue from these sources to creditors just to ensure the corporate exist-
ence. Even if the debtor is willing to make payments out of future
business revenues, there must be some assurance that these revenues
will exist before the court will find the plan to be feasible under section
1129(a)(11).18 Given many debtors' poor pre-bankruptcy earnings
records, it may be hard to demonstrate feasibility without the assur-
ance of an income source not dependent upon the debtors' own efforts,
namely income from leasing of presently undeveloped and unleased
land or income from other Native corporations under sections 7(i) and
70).
186. Id. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii).
187. Id. § 1129(a)(8).
188. Id. § 1129(a)(11).
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3. Cram-Down and the Absolute Priority Rule. If all classes of
shareholders and equity owners do not accept' 89 a plan, so that the
plan does not comply with section 1129(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code,
section 1129(b) 190 presents an alternative to these acceptance tests.
Under section 1129(b), if the plan proponent requests a "cram-down"
of the plan, that is, confirmation despite the rejection of one or more
classes, and the court determines that the plan is "fair and equitable"
with respect to the dissenting class of claims or interests, the plan can
still be confirmed. The "fair and equitable" test incorporates the rule,
originally judicially developed, known as the "absolute priority" rule.
According to the absolute priority rule, unless the claims of the dis-
senting class are paid in full, no class of claims or interests junior to
the dissenting class can receive or retain under the plan any property
on account of such claims or interest. Shareholders' claims are junior
to all creditors' claims. The rule has been generally interpreted to
mean that a plan cannot be crammed-down on a class of unsecured
claims if the shareholders of the debtor are to retain any stock, even if
the stock has no equity value due to the debtor's insolvency as of the
confirmation of the plan.191
189. For purposes of determining acceptance or rejection of a plan of reorganiza-
tion, the Bankruptcy Code provides that a class of claims (for example, the class of
unsecured creditors) is deemed to have accepted a plan if two-thirds in amount and
more than one-half in number of the creditors that vote, vote to approve the plan. 11
U.S.C. § 1126(c) (1982). A class of interests (for example, the common stock share-
holders) is deemed, under the Bankruptcy Code, to have accepted a plan if two-thirds
of the share that vote, vote in favor of the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(d) (1982 & Supp. IV
1986).
190. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
191. This was confirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Norwest Bank
Worthington v. Ahlers, - U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 963 (1988). In Ahlers, the debtors,
family farmers, proposed a plan of reorganization under which they would retain their
farmland and equipment. Their unsecured creditors rejected the plan, which did not
propose to pay them in full. Section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) of the Bankruptcy Code pro-
vides, in such circumstances, that the court may not confirm the plan unless claims
and interests junior to the dissenting class (in this case, the Ahlers themselves) will not
receive or retain under the plan any property on account of such claim or interest. 11
U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The court of appeals held that
future contributions of labor and experience by the Ahlers were sufficient to permit
them to retain the farm property notwithstanding the dissent of the unsecured credi-
tors. Ahlers v. Norwest Bank Worthington, 794 F.2d 388, 402-03 (8th Cir. 1986).
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that because a promise of future services had
no present measurable value and could not be added to the reorganized entity's bal-
ance sheet, it was not a substitute for the new "money or money's worth" which
would be required to retain an equity interest. The Supreme Court also rejected the
contention that because the Ahlers' farm operation was insolvent the retention of an
ownership interest in the farm did not constitute the retention of "property." The
Court held: "Even where debts far exceed the current value of assets, a debtor who
retains his equity interest in the enterprise retains 'property.'" 108 S. Ct. at 969.
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In effect, this means in a typical case that the unsecured creditors
in a chapter 11 case can require the debtor to liquidate or to propose a
plan which: terminates the interests of the existing shareholders; pays
to creditors in full (over time); or calls for a new equity investment and
the issuance of new stock in consideration for that investment. Rejec-
tion of any non-qualifying plan by the unsecured class will eventually
lead the court to grant a motion to convert the case to chapter 7.192 If
the unsecured creditors stand fast by the requisite majorities, they can
eventually force either a liquidation or a plan which satisfies their de-
mands, probably by proposing to pay their claims in full.
The absolute priority rule, then, prevents a chapter 11 corporate
debtor from confirming a plan over creditor objection, if the plan calls
for less than full payment to the creditors and also calls for the share-
holders to retain their stock in the corporation. The absolute priority
rule also gives the creditors the potential to cram down their own plan
over the dissent of the shareholders, a plan which may call for the
shareholders to lose all their stock in the corporation.
For a regional or village corporation in chapter 11, direct con-
flicts exist between the result dictated by the absolute priority rule and
the purposes of ANCSA. ANCSA stock may not be conveyed to a
non-Native except by descent 193 and may be conveyed to Native or
descendants of Natives only in limited circumstances. 194 This stock
transfer prohibition presently applies to all ANCSA stock195 and is
contained in section 7(h) of ANCSA:
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, Settlement Com-
mon Stock, inchoate rights thereto, and rights to dividends or distri-
butions declared with respect thereto shall not be -
(i) sold;
(ii) pledged;
192. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(5) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
193. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1606(h)(2) (1986 & West Supp. 1988).
194. Settlement Common Stock may be transferred to a Native or descendant of a
Native only: (1) pursuant to a court decree of separation, divorce, or child support;
(2) by a holder who is unable to practice his or her profession because of holding the
stock; and (3) as an inter vivos gift from a holder to the holder's child, grandchild,
great-grandchild, niece, or nephew. Id. § 1606(h)(1)(C).
195. ANCSA, as originally enacted in 1971, provided that these inalienability pro-
visions would expire in 1991. The 1991 Amendments to ANCSA contain extremely
complicated provisions dealing with how those inalienability provisions extend past
1991 and how they may be removed. A full description of those provisions is outside
the scope of this article, but, in summary, a corporation has four approaches to stock
restrictions:
(1) For all corporations, the restrictions continue indefinitely if the corporation
takes no action with respect to stock restriction. Id. § 1629c(a).
(2) For regional corporations, and for village corporations in the Bristol Bay and
Aleut regions, the corporations may elect, through a board of directors' resolution
followed by an affirmative shareholder vote, to extend the stock restrictions. If the
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(iii) subjected to a lien or judgment execution;
(iv) assigned in present or future;
(v) treated as an asset under -
(I) title 11 [of the United States Code] or any successor
statute,
(IH) any other insolvency or moratorium law, or
(III) other laws generally affecting creditors' rights; or
(vi) otherwise alienated.196
While this language is directed primarily at the shareholders' credi-
tors, as opposed to the corporation's creditors, there is little question
that the purpose behind these inalienability provisions was to keep
ANCSA corporations in Native control. In light of this overriding
purpose and the clear prohibition in subsection (vi) against otherwise
alienating the stock, one would expect that a bankruptcy court would
interpret the absolute priority rule in a manner which would enable
shareholders to keep their stock.197
If ANCSA permits a Native corporation to obtain confirmation
of a plan that calls for shareholders to keep their stock but that does
not comply with the absolute priority rule, then it has afforded Native
corporate debtors a powerful weapon. The only protection left for un-
secured creditors in such a case is the requirement that all creditors
who vote against the plan be paid as much as they could receive in a
chapter 7 liquidation. 198 Computing the liquidation value of the
debtor is difficult for any enterprise, and especially so for a Native
corporation because in most cases the land assets are remote and lack
an active market, while future section 7(i) or 70) income is virtually
impossible to quantify with any certainty 19 9 Because of these un-
certainities, the court may accept a low value for the nonexempt land
vote fails, the stock restrictions expire automatically in 1991. This is the so-called
"opt-in" approach. Id. § 1629c(d).
(3) Except for corporations that elect the opt-in procedure, stock restrictions ter-
minate only if the corporations affirmatively so vote. This is the "opt-out" approach.
Id. § 1629c(b).
(4) All corporations can recapitalize their corporations by voting for a package
which can include extending the restrictions and also include issuing additional stock
or different classes of stock (different stock which may be alienable and have different
voting and dividend rights). Id. § 1629c(c).
196. Id. § 1606(h)(1)(B).
197. A contrary result would negate the effect of other ANCSA provisions. For
example, if the creditors could gain control of all the corporation's stock, the creditors
could then remove undeveloped land from the automatic land bank.
198. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
199. Much of the land will, moreover, be protected by the automatic land bank
and, therefore, be excluded from the calculation. Section 7(i) and 70) revenues may or
may not be available to pay creditors' claims. See supra text accompanying notes 140-
52.
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and future income assets.2 0° The debtor can then propose a plan
which makes installment payments to creditors equal, in present value,
to the low hypothetical chapter 7 liquidation value, thus allowing
shareholders to retain their stock and the benefit of any future devel-
opment or increase in value of corporate assets above the liquidation
value.
4. Other Plan of Reorganization Issues. A not uncommon feature
of a plan of reorganization in a chapter 11 case is for the debtor to
issue a new class of stock to be given to the creditors in exchange for
their claims. Typically the stock is in the nature of preferred stock
and may carry any of a wide range of dividend rights, voting rights,
liquidation rights, etc. Despite the stock transfer restrictions that ap-
ply to common stock of Native corporations, a plan calling for a new
class of stock to be issued to the creditors is possible in Native corpo-
ration bankruptcies.
The 1991 Amendments to ANCSA authorize any Native corpo-
ration to issue "g(2)" stock, that is, stock issued pursuant to section
7(g)(2) of ANCSA, as amended.20 1 The corporation has wide discre-
tion in defining the rights associated with "g(2)" stock that it issues. If
the corporation wishes, the stock can be freely transferable or not, be
issued to Natives or non-Natives, and have whatever dividend rights,
voting rights, and other rights the corporation designates. The stock
can be issued by itself or in connection with an overall recapitalization
of the Native corporation which also addresses other stock alienability
issues.202 The "g(2)" stock issuance requires an amendment of the ar-
ticles of incorporation to be approved by a majority of all the out-
standing voting stock of the corporation20 3 and, for this reason, could
only be included in a debtor-sponsored plan. u 4
200. Because section 7(i) and 70) payments are based on the number of sharehold-
ers, these payments, even if available in perpetuity to pay creditors' claims, are not
likely to be a significant source of repayment of creditors' claims except in the case of
the strong and the very largest villages.
201. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1606(g)(2) (1986 & West Supp. 1988).
202. Id. § 1629c(c). See also supra note 195 and accompanying text.
203. 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1629b(b), (d), (e) (1986 & West Supp. 1988). This raises a
potential issue: if two-thirds of the voting shares, but less than a majority of all shares
that have the right to vote, approve a plan calling for issuance of "g(2)" stock, then
the Bankruptcy Code standard of shareholder approval will have been met, see 11
U.S.C. § 1126(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), but the ANCSA standard will not, 43
U.S.C.A. 1629b(d) (1986 & West Supp. 1988). This situation could conceivably arise
if the debtor's management proposed a plan calling for issuance of "g(2)" stock but
was unable to obtain sufficient shareholder support.
204. A creditor plan that called for "g(2)" stock could not be confirmed over the
objection of the Native shareholders because the absolute priority rule does not oper-
ate to wipe out the shareholders' interests.
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In the event that creditors are dissatisfied with a chapter 11
debtor's reorganization efforts, the creditors may file a plan of reorgan-
ization of their own.20 5 As noted above, the automatic land bank, the
possible insulation of section 7(i) and 7(j) revenues, and the inability to
cancel Native-owned ANCSA stock or to assume complete control of
the corporation, will hamper the creditors' ability to confirm a plan to
their liking over the debtor's objection. Their solution may be to pro-
pose a plan which transfers all nonexempt bankruptcy estate assets to
a new corporation owned by the creditors. The stock in this corpora-
tion would be distributed to creditors as payment of their claims.
While not as drastic as elimination of the Native shareholder interests
in full, a plan that would give virtually all the productive assets to the
creditors, for good, would deprive the shareholders of much hope for
future gain. On the other hand, the confirmation of the plan would
make the debtor debt-free of all pre-petition debts, and the debtor
would own the undeveloped land and, possibly, also the section 7(i)
and 7(j) revenues. Further, such a plan would be consistent with the
Bankruptcy Code and not inconsistent with ANCSA.
Should the court be confronted with two confirmable plans, one
proposed by creditors and calling for payment out of future earnings
and one proposed by shareholder-oriented interests calling for liquida-
tion value payment only, section 1129(c) of the Bankruptcy Code says
the court shall consider "preferences of creditors and equity security
holders in determining which plan to confirm. ' 20 6 Where preferences
are split by class, as would be expected under the foregoing hypotheti-
cal, the court will have to make its own judgment on the weight to be
given to Congress' divergent purposes expressed in ANCSA and the
Bankruptcy Code.
IV. CONCLUSION
Resolving the conflicts between the Bankruptcy Code and
ANCSA is not easy, as neither statute was drafted with a view to har-
monizing with the other. The Bankruptcy Code reflects a congres-
sional concern for the protection of the creditors of an insolvent
enterprise, to the exclusion, if necessary, of the shareholders. These
concerns conflict with the broad goals of ANCSA and its amend-
ments: to satisfy Alaska Native claims with property and the chance
of a better economic future, and to preserve land and other cultural
205. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1102, 1121(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). At least one committee
of creditors is appointed in every chapter 11 case. Additional committees of creditors
and equity holders may also be appointed if appropriate. Committees have broad
powers, including the power to propose or participate in the formulation of a plan. Id.
§ 1103(c).
206. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(c) (1982).
[Vol. 6:73
1989] BANKRUPTCY OF NATIVE CORPORATIONS 131
attributes of the Native people in perpetuity without jeopardizing
them through exposure to the very economic forces from which the
hoped-for prosperity can emerge. Indeed, the conflict is inherent in
ANCSA itself as the goals of ANCSA are internally inconsistent if the
pursuit of economic gain is to be conducted in the economic environ-
ment in which the ANCSA corporations were originally intended to
operate. ANCSA can instruct the Native corporations to pursue eco-
nomic growth without jeopardizing the income and lands allocated to
Alaska Natives under ANCSA; but legislation cannot compel busi-
nesses to prosper, nor can legislation compel prosperity without risk.
These goals of maximizing creditor recovery and preserving the
lands and cultural values protected by ANCSA can each be achieved
to a degree with Native corporations forced into bankruptcy, but only
if the strict interpretations of the two statutes are relaxed.

